Washington ready for Ecevit Visit
The Turkish Times with wire services - Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit will visit Washington in the week of January 14 to take important steps to render "strategic partnership" a reality between the two NATO allies. The top items on PM's agenda are developing deeper and more favorable trade ties with the United States, cancellation of Turkish military debt, a discussion of the situation in Afghanistan, and a review of the U.S. policy on Iraq.

Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit will try to ease U.S. restrictions on textile, iron and steel imports, he told The Associated Press Friday.

He also would be "very happy" if Turkey's $5 billion-plus debt for defense purchases from the United States could be "canceled, softened or postponed.''

During his five-day visit beginning Monday, Jan 14, Ecevit will promote recent reforms, which were "making a market economy workable in Turkey." Leaders of TUSIAD (Turkish Association of Industrialists and Businessmen) and heads of all the major Turkish chambers of commerce, industry and bourses will be accompanying Ecevit.

Turkey already has received $19 billion in International Monetary Fund loans and is likely to receive another $10 billion this year.

"We hope that there will now be increased interest in investing in Turkey ... particularly by the United States,'' said Ecevit, who is scheduled to meet President Bush Wednesday. Turkey's economic crisis caused a 50 percent currency devaluation and at least a million layoffs last year.

Turkey attracts just $1 billion annually in foreign investment - a third of neighboring Bulgaria, which has a far smaller population and economy.

The U.S. ambassador in Turkey, Robert Pearson, said the crisis stems from "layers of red tape'' blocking investment.

But Ecevit said that red tape was being cut.

"Until now an investor would have to knock on at least 40 doors'' to overcome bureaucratic barriers, Ecevit said. "Now only one door will be knocked.''

He also said "three months is enough'' for a process that once took three years.

Ecevit's government has stepped up its reforms as it seeks to present strong evidence of Turkey's economic turnaround.

In the last two weeks, parliament has shored up a crisis-rocked banking sector, ended the state's monopoly over tobacco sales, eliminated corruption in state contracts and created special industrial zones offering tax incentives to producers.

Turkey also wants to increase exports, particularly since domestic demand has slumped in the crisis.

Ecevit said he hoped his Washington visit would boost exports to the United States, adding that Turkey sought similar trade privileges with European Union countries.

A key concern for Ecevit will be securing a cut in U.S. quotas for textile imports. Textiles comprised over 40 percent of Turkey's $2.8 billion in exports to the United States in 2000.

There are signs the United States is prepared to meet at least some Turkish expectations.

"The U.S. looks forward to considering specific Turkish proposals to expand trade, including a possible free trade agreement,'' Pearson said in Istanbul last month.

Ecevit also said Turkey needs financial aid to help pay for its participation in the international peacekeeping force in Afghanistan.

Turkey will send 261 troops and personnel to join the British-led force and could increase that presence to 500 personnel if given control of the force.

Iraq
Turkish concerns over any U.S. military action against Iraq - as well as relief for Turkey's $5 billion military debt - will be key points of discussion in a visit to Washington next week, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit said Friday.

Turkey, a NATO member and a U.S. ally, has been a strong supporter of the U.S.-led anti-terrorism campaign.

But it fears that an American operation against Iraq could lead to the formation of a Kurdish state in the areas of northern Iraq that border the country. Turkey has fought for 15 years against Kurdish rebels within its borders and does not want the conflict to flare up again if Kurds across the border achieve statehood.

Washington has not announced any plans to attack Iraq. President Bush has said the U.S. war against terrorism would not be limited to Afghanistan, but has not said what country might next become a U.S. military target.

Ecevit will meet with Bush on Wednesday.

"The situation in Iraq is very important for us - it is our neighbor. We hope that a new problem will not arise for Turkey in regard to the situation in Iraq,'' Ecevit said in an interview with The Associated Press.

"Of course, the United States may have its own concerns, we are committed to ... discussing such efforts jointly with the United States particularly regarding Iraq,'' he said.

Ecevit, who is due to begin his five-day trip Monday, said he could not discuss the details of Turkey's position regarding Iraq before speaking to U.S. officials.

Turkey is important for any U.S. military action against Iraq. Turkey served as a launching pad for attacks against Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War, and U.S. and British warplanes enforcing a no-fly zone above northern Iraq are based in Turkey.

Ecevit was an ardent opponent of Turkey's cooperation with the United States during the Gulf War. He visited Iraqi President Saddam Hussein twice during that period. As prime minister, he has sought to improve bilateral trade and normalize ties, last year appointing Turkey's first ambassador to Baghdad since the Gulf War.

However, relations have been undermined by Turkey's permission for U.S. air patrols over Iraq.

Turkish military and civilian leaders recently signaled that Turkey's chief concern is Iraq's territorial integrity, not the survival of Hussein's regime.

"Iraq should not disintegrate. If Iraq is divided, it could open new wounds in the Middle East,'' Gen. Huseyin Kivrikoglu, chief of Turkey's general staff, said Tuesday. "The problem for us is not Saddam or anyone else ... the people of Iraq should decide on this.''

Ecevit stressed that formation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq could pose a threat to Turkey's unity. Turkey fears that such a development could provoke Kurdish rebels seeking autonomy in Turkey's Kurdish-dominated southeast, bordering Iraq.

"We definitely can't accept that,'' Ecevit said. "We will never allow that.''

Bulent Aliriza, of the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, said military action against Iraq could test Turkish-U.S. relations.

"It is entirely possible that despite its very serious reservations, the Ecevit government could still make a volte-face and follow Washington's lead on Iraq,'' Aliriza said.

Ecevit asks "recognition of Turkey as a preferential trade partner"
The Turkish Times - In a luncheon address he delivered at US Chamber of Commerce on January 15, Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit stressed the way recent events in Afghanistan made the "convergence of Turkish-US interests in the Eurasian geography all the more visible." He mentioned "recognition of Turkey as a preferential trade partner" as the logical direction in which the Turkish-US "strategic partnership" can expand and evolve. The American-Turkish Council (ATC), the Turkish-U.S. Business Council and DEIK were co-sponsors of the luncheon.

"The recent unfolding of developments has made the convergence of Turkish-US interests in the Eurasian geography all the more visible. As the main pillar of this vision, Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan and Sahdeniz pipeline projects provide an excellent base we can build upon. Turkish firms remain active in Russia, the Balkans, the Caucus, Central Asia and the Middle East and can serve as excellent partners for US firms to investigate distribution and investment opportunities throughout the region."

"Turkey and the US are important agriculture trading partners as well. The involvement of the US business community in Southeast Anatolian project (GAP) Region is important. This integrated project creates an enormous opportunity for US businesses interested in agribusiness, food processing, textiles, energy, mining, transportation and a variety of services."

"We appreciate US support, especially during the last year, when we were faced with a very serious economic crisis. We rely on the continuation of this support. Our shared foreign policy objectives and priorities provide a strong impetus for improving trade relations between Turkey and the United States. In fact it has always been our objective to bring our economic and trade relations with the United States up to the level of the existing strategic alliance between our two countries."

"However, we still need to work further to bring our economic relations and bilateral trade up to this level. For example the annual trade volume between Turkey and the United States is only about $7 billion. The United States has a very low share of the Turkish import market with only 5%. Turkey has an even lower share of the growing US economy with only 0.25% of US imports."

"The United States is Turkey's second largest trading partner, but US firms accounted for only 11.5% of foreign investment in Turkey in the year 2000. The United States is thus after France, Germany and the Netherlands.

We have liberalized our trade regime and capital markets. Through the Customs Union with the European Union, Turkey has dramatically reduced tariffs on US goods and materials. These measures resulted in a better market access for United States products as well. Turkey is one of the few counties with which the U.S. has a trade surplus."

"While Turkey was taking these measures, US tariffs on Turkish imports remained high and intact. And Turkish exports to the US still face significant non-tariff barriers. We must endeavor to develop every aspect of our partnership to ensure its continued strength and growth. The United States' recognition of Turkey as a preferential trade partner will be an important step in strengthening and completing our strategic partnership."

"We understand that trade represents a very sensitive issue in the U.S., but believe we can conclude a trade agreement that will benefit the economic interests of both countries. The existing forums and mechanisms have not been adequate to achieve this goal. We are hoping that negotiations will start very soon to this effect."

Qualified Industrial Zones
"We must also elaborate on the idea of establishing Qualified Industrial Zones in Turkey in order to encourage capital investment. I'm sure this is a matter of special interest to many of you present here today. As you know, the United States has such relationships with other countries in the area.

One of the major aims of my visit to Washington and appearance at this luncheon is to promote commercial and economic relations between Turkey and the United States. The presence of cabinet members responsible for economy and trade, our Foreign Minister, the Undersecretary of Foreign Trade, Chairman of the Turkish Chamber of Commerce as well as leaders of the Turkish private sector testifies to the importance we attach to Turkish-US economic and trade relations.

Recent tragic events have clearly demonstrated the importance of strong friendship between our nations. In times of trouble, we must be able to rely on our friends and allies. Turkey and the United States have stood together to confront fifty years of challenges. We have worked diligently to strengthen our defensive and strategic alliance. We must now devote the same energy to also developing our commercial and economic relations," Ecevit concluded.

Ecevit to Washington: Opportunities for US-Turkish Relations
News Analysis by Amb. Mark Parris, The Washington Institute - Visits by Turkish prime ministers to Washington have tended in years past to be low-profile events. With imagination and boldness on the American side, the January 16 meeting between President George W. Bush and Turkish prime minister Bülent Ecevit has the potential to be a watershed in a relationship that will affect vital U.S. interests well into the new century.

Turkey and America, Pre- and Post-September 11
Turkey's importance to the United States is not news. During the Cold War, it anchored NATO's southern flank. With the collapse of the Soviet Union it became a critical nexus for transnational issues like drugs, organized crime, energy transport, and terrorism. But unlike some other strategically placed countries, Turkey has consistently offered Washington unique added value -- a willingness to put its troops next to U.S. forces in some tough spots: Korea, the Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

September 11 and its aftermath have validated Turkey's importance to Washington and highlighted an additional dimension -- the country's Muslim identity. Ecevit's prompt announcement of Turkey's unconditional support for the United States was the first and clearest in the Muslim world; so were his offers to put Turkish combat troops on the ground in Afghanistan and to participate in a multinational peacekeeping force there. Those announcements punctured portrayals of the U.S. response to September 11 as a clash between Islam and a Christian West, and provided cover for other Muslim states, including Pakistan, to support U.S. efforts.

Opportunities Ahead
Four months into the first war of the twenty-first century, the value to U.S. interests of a prosperous, democratic, militarily capable Turkey is manifest. The range of areas in which Ankara can be helpful to the United States in the months and years ahead includes the following:

The Afghanistan end game, where Turkish troops will be among the initial peacekeepers, where the Turks are expected to assume leadership of the force from Britain this spring, and where Turks will be training Afghan police and military.

Iraq, where Turkey will be crucial to the success of any U.S. strategy, from containment to outright invasion.

Syria, where Turkey's proximity and success in ending Damascus's support for Kurdish terrorists will be relevant in efforts to achieve a definitive break with terrorism there.

Caspian/Central Asian energy, where construction of the BakuTiblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and an associated gas route will create alternatives to Middle Eastern hydrocarbon sources and help ensure that Georgia and Azerbaijan do not become "failed states" ripe for extremist exploitation.

The Arab-Israeli arena, where Turkey -- alone among Muslim states -- has the credibility to work constructively with both Israel and its Arab neighbors. (Israel's prime minister has declared that, aside from the United States, Turkey is Israel's most important relationship).

U.S.-Islam relations, where a successful, modern Turkey illustrates that there is no intrinsic contradiction between Islam and Western values.

Ecevit's Visit
Whether or not Turkey is able to play these roles could depend on what happens during Prime Minister Ecevit's visit. He comes at a truly pivotal moment for Turkey. Economic crises over the past year have cut the value of the country's currency in half; contracted its GDP by 8 percent; decimated its middle class, universities, and other institutions; gutted its military modernization budget; and swelled the ranks of unemployed. In response, Ecevit's coalition has stepped up to the task of legislating sweeping, International Monetary Fund (IMF)mandated macroeconomic reforms to set the stage for a projected recovery in 2002. But this decisiveness has come at a cost: drooping polls for the parties represented in the coalition, incipient public protests, and waxing strength for a well- rooted Islamist opposition.

IMF and World Bank disbursements kept Turkey from hitting the rocks in 2001, and can probably help avoid a new crash this year. But maintaining financial life support will not be enough for the Ecevit government to shake off the trauma of the past year; see its economic reform program through to its conclusion; regain the domestic and foreign investor confidence needed to ignite sustainable growth; and strengthen its role as a force for peace, stability, and modern values in a troubled region.

U.S.-Turkey Agenda
The first order of business in U.S.-Turkish relations is not to treat the Ecevit visit as business as usual. A key test will be whether the administration is prepared to cut through bureaucratic resistance and make the case in Congress. If it does, it could use the visit materially to improve chances that Turkey will weather its current economic difficulties and emerge as a stronger strategic partner of the United States. Specifically, key steps that could be taken by the administration to support common U.S.-Turkish interests include the following:

Support Turkey's request for additional IMF and World Bank standby assistance in 2002, assuming that Turkey maintains its creditable discipline to date on reforms.

Take steps to shore up Turkey's "real" economy and ease the shortterm pain of the reform program. The key here is to increase or preserve access to the U.S. market for sectors that will have maximum impact on Turkish jobs and wages: textiles and steel, respectively Turkey's first and third most important exports to this country. Reflecting their importance to the ability of Turkey to stay the course, Ecevit has stated publicly that such issues will head his agenda.

Firm up Turkey's military modernization program. Given the frequency with which U.S. and Turkish forces serve together in harm's way, this is simply about protecting the lives of U.S. servicemen and servicewomen. The United States can partially make up for erosion of the lira by forgiving Turkey's FMS (foreign military sales) debt and transferring excess equipment that will enhance the mobility and effectiveness of Turkish forces. Moreover, the United States can provide assurances that future Turkish purchases of new equipment will not be held up on technicalities, as some past transfers have been.

Appoint a senior official -- preferably from the political echelon -- to oversee the U.S.-Turkish relationship. This would correct the chronic structural dysfunction arising from the fact that Turkey falls between the European and Near Eastern stools of the U.S. foreign affairs bureaucracy. While the Bush administration is wary of its predecessor's use of bilateral commissions to manage multifaceted relationships with key international actors, Turkey is one case where something like the Gore- Chernomyrdin Commission would be of enormous utility in handling potentially difficult issues like Iraq.

Make unequivocally and publicly clear the U.S. commitment to building the Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan pipeline, a project of enormous importance to Turkey (and to U.S. strategic and energy interests). Few of these ideas are revolutionary; most have been studied extensively at the working levels of government. Adopted in a comprehensive fashion, they would permit Ecevit to return to Ankara confident that the United States appreciates and is prepared to reflect -- in deed as well as word -- the importance of its relations with Washington's most reliable ally in the Muslim world, and one of its best anywhere. Looking to future phases of the war on terrorism -against the backdrop of America's other global and regional priorities -- this could make a big difference for U.S. interests.

Mark Parris, who served as U.S. ambassador to Turkey (1997- 2000), is the new counselor to the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute. Copyright THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE for Near East Policy 1828 L Street Suite 1050 Washington, D.C. 20036. Phone: (202) 452-0650, Fax: (202) 223-5364. E-Mail:info@washingtoninstitute.org

Denktas sees deal on missing Cypriots
The Turkish Timeswith wire services - Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus president Rauf Denktas and Greek-Cypriot President Glafcos Clerides seem to be inching towards finding a solution to the problem of missing in Cyprus. The positive development came after the two leaders met twice on Friday, Jan 11. Their first, 45-minute talks were held without advisers at an abandoned compound of Nicosia airport, now a United Nations base.

"We now have the opportunity to resolve this issue...I do not see any obstacles to an agreement (on missing persons) should they (the Greek Cypriots) not change their minds," President Denktas told reporters at his residence in northern Cyprus.

They returned for their second meeting almost five hours later after consulting their humanitarian advisers, Greek Cypriot sources said. Journalists were barred from the compound.

The focus of the meetings was a 1997 agreement between the two sides. The deal, never implemented, called on them to exchange information on mass graves and make arrangements for the return of remains to relatives.

Some 1,480 Greek Cypriots and 803 Turkish Cypriots have been missing for decades, posing one of the most emotive issues complicating the Cyprus question.

Denktas and Clerides, who have met twice socially in the past month in a dramatic thaw in relations, stressed the talks were quite separate from next week's meetings. They have agreed on the need to end relatives' suffering.

Denktas said both sides would prepare documents and exchange them on Monday, when he said he would meet with the special U.N. envoy on Cyprus, Alvaro De Soto, due to arrive on the island on Sunday.

"The two sides will put on paper and exchange views on how a practical course of action can be followed to ascertain the fate of the missing persons," Greek Cypriot spokesman Michalis Papapetrou told reporters at a news conference in the south.

A new meeting would be arranged for the two leaders to discuss how to move forward.

A tripartite committee for missing persons was created in the early eighties to probe individual cases. It has failed to conclude one single case but Denktas said the new atmosphere of cooperation may now bring results.

"If the committee is revitalised with certain criteria this issue can easily be solved," he said.

Greek Cypriots vanished during the 1974 Turkish intervention, and Turkish Cypriots during the Greek coup of 1974 to annex the island to Greece ("enosis"), as well as in the 1960s and 1970s when Greek paramilitary forces tried to cleanse the island off its Turkish citizens. Among the missing on both sides are children and other civilians.