Prejudices and worn-out clichés against the Turkish Cypriots TO: The Editor The Christian Science Monitor February 26, 2002 While the article by Richard Hottelet entitled "Solving Cyprus: The Other Mideast Conflict" (the Christian Science Monitor, February 21) appears factual and balanced on the surface, a closer reading of it will reveal certain subtle prejudices and worn-out clichés against the Turkish Cypriot side, which are unfair and unhelpful. A glaring example is the use of loaded terms such as "Greek majority and Turkish minority" who have "clawed one another in civil war and ethnic cleansing". Legally and politically, there has never been a "majority" or "minority" in Cyprus where no single nation exists, and which serves as the common home of two peoples of equal status, who are different from each other from the standpoint of culture, language, religion and national and ethnic origin. When the Turks and Greeks of Cyprus agreed to form a single state in 1960, by exercising their separate right to self-determination, they were not doing so to create a unitary "Cypriot nation" but a bi-national partnership state of two equal co-founders. The numerical size of each partner forming this "functionally federal" state was irrelevant in so far as internatinal law was concerned, since both had equal say in the affairs and destiny of the island. However, in three short years, the Greek Cypriots launched an all-out offensive against the partnership constitution of 1960, and an armed onslaught against the Turkish Cypriot partner, in order to destroy both. While they succeeded in the first by tearing up the constitution and declaring it "dead and buried", they could not fully succeed in the second, thanks to the stiff resistance put up by the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey's right of guarantee to protect and defend the Turkish Cypriots under the 1960 treaties. These historically documented facts cannot be described as two communities "clawing one another" or be passed off simply as "communal strife", for that would be tantamount to equating the aggressor with the victim. The violence between 1963-74 was nothing less than the precursor of the abhorrent practice of ethnic cleansing perpetrated by the Greek Cypriots against the Turkish Cypriots, long before the term was coined in connection with the Bosnia tragedy. In fact, the American media (i.e. the Washington Post) used the term "genocide" to describe the officially-sponsored terror campaign practiced against the Turkish Cypriots at the time. As in the case of similar other situations, statistics do not tell the whole or even the true story in Cyprus. I was, therefore, surprised that the author of the article, who, to his credit, seems to be uncommitted to either side's political position, has used figures on the demography and land ownership in Cyprus, etc. which are not only incorrect but also misleading. The Turkish Cypriots who are 23-25 percent of the total population of the island (not 18 percent as claimed) have traditionally enjoyed a greater percentage of land as largely the farming community of Cyprus, to the tune of about 33 percent. They are naturally entitled to their fair share of public land. I hasten to add, however, that the sensitive issue of territory cannot be discussed on the basis of abstract percentages or a single criterion, but on the basis of qualitative and other criteria which have emerged during the course of UN sponsored negotiations, such as economic viability, productivity, bi-zonality and, above all, security. I should also stress that the continued presence of an equal number of troops from Turkey and Greece, under the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance, although reduced in number, would be an indispensable element of security, in the context of a settlement, if Cyprus is to enjoy uninterrupted peace and stability. I am afraid that an international force, with its complicated decision-making mechanism and military and political limitations, could not perform this task. One does not have to look very far for proof, when an international peace-keeping force (UNFICYP) has been on the island since 1964, but was unable to stop the wholesale massacre of Turkish Cypriots during the 1963-74 period. Finally, I wish to put on record that the objective of the current face-to-face talks is not the attainment of "cultural" or any other form of "autonomy" for "each community" but, for us, to see how or if the two existing sovereign and independent States on Cyprus can form a new Partnership by jointly exercising some of their powers and functions on agreed terms. This process, as many others before it, such as in 1977 and 1979, started at the initiative of Turkish Cypriot President Rauf Denktas, a fact which belies all assertions of "Turkish obstinacy" - another worn-out cliché in the long saga of Cyprus. Let history be the judge! Sincerely, Osman Ertug Representative Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Washington, DC *** Why I no longer subscribe to CSM" To: Christian Science Monitor Subject: Solving Cyprus Saturday, February 23, 2002 The article, Solving Cyprus: the other Mideast conflict By Richard C. Hottelet from the February 21, 2002 edition and similar articles are the reason why I no longer subscribe to CSM. I do not oppose to a pro-Greek Cypriot article. But I would like to occasionally see an article which is somewhat balanced. For example; "Its ethnic Greek majority and Turkish minority have clawed one another in civil war and ethnic cleansing." , leaves the reader confused as to who was trying to cleanse the island from the other. Please publish that the Greek Cypriots were committing ethnic cleansing. The term was not coined yet in the 1960's, but today it is considered to be crime. For example; "1974, a military clique in Athens tried to overthrow the government of Greek Archbishop Makarios for the purpose of enosis uniting Cyprus with Greece. Thirty-five thousand Turkish troops were rushed in to prevent that for all time and to protect the Turkish community" omits the fact that Turkey avoided unilateral action as much as possible. Turkish pleas to act together with Greece and England fell into deaf ears, as long as the victims were Turkish Cypriots. Both Greece and England refused to take any action. For example;"The force has been there ever since, cutting the island in two, poisoning relations between Greece and Turkey a perpetual worry for NATO, to which both countries belong, through much of the cold war." "Poisoning relationship" ? Turks have no choice. There is no guarantee that Greek Cypriot would not run over the Turkish Cypriots if it was not for the Turkish military. For example; "The United Nations has been in Cyprus since 1964, trying to promote peace, patrolling a buffer zone between the two sides, and urging negotiations." The UN Peace force has been ineffective. They have not been any different than their counterparts in Bosnia who only allowed Serbians to massacre Bosnians. Now, Milosevich is being prosecuted for the massacers he supervised. I am not aware of any Greek Cypriot official ever brought to justice. Greek Cypriots regularly massacred Turkish Cypriots prior to 1974. There is more to say about this article's pro-Greek slant, but the point has been made with the above examples. Mr. Hottlet thinks the Turkish side has been softened by the promise to enter the EU, IMF funds, ect. and the Turkish Cypriots would submit to something less than what they seek. In actuality, Turks only desire to live in peace in pursuit of happiness just like anyone around Boston, free of massacres, and discrimination, with judicial fairness, and equal opportunity in education and employment. Greek Cypriots need to recognize the rights of Turkish Cypriots not on paper but in their hearts and accept Turkish Cypriots as their partners. There cannot be any change in the status quo without this fundamental change. Journalists can effect the peace process by being objective in their reporting. We do not even report fairly let alone act fairly. So how can we expect a fair settlement in a dispute when in the court of public opinion are misinformed by the witness in the case. Like in any case in a court, if the jury concludes an unfair verdict because of misinformation, deception or plain lying by witnesses, than the slighted side will not accept the conclusion of the court. This is why conflicts cannot even come close to settling. We should avoid becoming unintended co-conspirators of any international crime by not telling ALL the facts. In the case of CSM, it is contributing knowingly or otherwise to the continuation of a conflict by not scrutinizing its authors for unbiased reporting. Tamer Acikalin, MD, MBA Louisiana (Dr. Acikalin is a former President of ATAA)

The New War and Turkey
By M. Orhan Tarhan - At his State of the Union Speech, President George W. Bush spelled out the next targets of the "New War on Terrorism". The three states, he called "The Axis of Evil", are Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Two of these states, Iraq and Iran, are neighbors of Turkey. Any military operation against these states has to involve Turkey. Both of these states have been guilty of terroristic acts against Turkey. For a long time, both have hosted the PKK and allowed it to operate from inside their own territories. Since the Gulf War, North Iraq is no longer under the control of Saddam Hussein, so the Turkish Army has been free to enter this territory and combat the remnants of the PKK itself. Iran is believed to be responsible for several assassinations of Turkish secularist intellectuals and Journalists. The Turkish state was reluctant to pursue the investigation of these crimes to their normal conclusions, which proves that these terrorist acts succeeded in intimidating the Turkish politicians.

Both of these states are dangerous for Turkey. Both are equally dangerous because they are developing weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, and both would have no scruples in using them. Those developments are believed not to be completed. Some people who are knowledgeable on nuclear developments indicate that neither Iraq nor Iran should be close to having nuclear bombs and delivery systems. Still. it makes sense for the U.S. and for Turkey to stop these developments before they reach completion.

Iraq is a heterogeneous state with Kurds and Turkomans in the North, Sunni Arabs in the middle, and Shiite Arabs in the South. It is probable that the defeat of Saddam's state would lead to the creation of three separate states, including a Kurdish state in the North. The present Turkish Government is afraid of such a Kurdish state. I discussed that question recently in this column. I am not going to repeat it here. Unlike Iran, Saddam's state does not present any religious danger for Turkey, because Iraq is quite secular.

Iran has been exporting religious fundamentalism to Turkey without Turkey responding to it in any way. We discussed this subject also quite extensively in the past. All the nasty things that come from Iran come from a nasty cleric called Kamenei. Turkish government people made agreements of cooperation with the Iranian foreign policy officials, Kamenei always broke these agreements. Kamenei is also responsible for regularly torpedoing the Middle East peace agreements by pulling the ropes of the Hezbollah and Hamas. The Hezbollah organization discovered in Turkey a few years ago also was a creation of Iran and most likely of Kamenei.

In spite of all the above, Turks feel no hostility toward Iraqis and Iranians. In fact they feel sorry for them for having to live under such awful governments. It is the Iraqi and Iranian governments they dislike.

No one knows yet when and how Iraq and Iran will be attacked and to what extent Turkey will be involved.. One thing is almost certain, namely that Iraq will come first. However, it seams that the U.S. has not yet figured out how the Iraq problem should be resolved.

On February 5, Guneri Civaoglu of Milliyet wrote an article in which he said that the campaign against Iraq has entered the count-down stage.[ That is not the case yet] He analyzed methods by which Saddam may be defeated: (1) By internal uprising (Very unlikely, because Saddam is well defended) (2) By arming the Kurds, and giving them air support like in Afghanistan (Would not work, because Saddam's divisions and tanks would chew them up) (3) Only a joint attack by U.S. and Turkish troops with American air support would succeed. He thinks that Turkey should not remain as a spectator, but should use its own troops, so that in the post-Saddam negotiations it should have a voice.

I did not think that Mr.Civaoglu was a good military strategist. Well, he is just a journalist. He is right that neither internal uprising nor arming the Kurds would work. But I am sure that the U.S. General Staff will prepare a better plan than to attack Iraq just from the North. In the Gulf War, the campaign had started with an intense air bombardment to gain definite air superiority and to soften up all targets. And then land forces had joined the battle. It would be very likely that U.S. forces would also attack from Kuwait. Right now, it does not seem likely that Saudi territory will be available as it was in the Gulf War. Thus, Iraqi forces will be forced to a two-front war, one in the South, and the other in the North.

On February 8, Fikret Bila of Milliyet reported of a letter exchange between Prime Minister Ecevit and Saddam Hussein. Ecevit had asked Saddam insistently that he accepts again the UN inspectors to save himself from another war. Saddam's reply was basically negative. He said that if Turkey is nice enough to insist on Iraqi territorial integrity, it should also get rid of the U.S. and British air planes at Incirlik which fly over Northern Iraq. He also did not show any inclination to be willing to readmit the UN arms inspector. Bila reported that Ecevit was going to do all he can to prevent an attack on Iraq, but if he is not successful, he is not going to watch the attack from behind the border. Thus, it appears that the Turkish Government will heed Mr. Civaoglu's advice and provide Turkish Troops to the U.S. attack. By the way, it was fully realized in Turkey, that, if President Bush would make up his mind on attacking Iraq, no one could change it. In spite of that, P.M. Bulent Ecevit stated recently that "We want a military operation against Iraq to be out of the question" Unfortunately that desire of Mr. Ecevit is not likely to materialize. In this battle, unlike in Afghanistan, the U.S. will have to commit heavy forces, big tanks, and the sort of troops used in the Gulf War. Therefore, there will be a long preparation period, during which heavy equipment would be shipped to Iskenderun and to Kuwait and hence there would be no surprise. Another delay is caused by the depletion of precision guided bombs in the Afghan War. Washington Post of February 24 had a front page article by Pincus and DeYoung titled "Anti-Iraq Rhetoric Outpaces Reality" in which it appeared that U.S. Armed Forces are really not quite ready to attack Iraq, that it might take several more months to be prepared. Thus, the above news by Fikret Bila that a count-down may have started was quite premature.

The problem with Iran will have obviously to wait until Iraq is defeated and reorganized. I wonder whether by then Kamenei & Co. will see the writing on the wall and change their spots to save their skin. But few radicals ever are willing to change their spots. The U.S. should try to get the unhappy young people in Iran to oppose Kamenei & Co. and support that youth. This would take considerable diplomatic skill to manage.

Lumping all Iranians together and attacking Iran, would throw the democratically minded youth into the lap of the mullahs and may force them to fight the U.S. That would be very unfortunate.

Mr. S. Rob Sobhani, an adjunct professor of politics at Georgetown University, wrote on February in Wall Street Journal, that "ordinary Iranians applaud [President George W.] Bush's Axis of evil talk". He received many e-mails and faxes from Iran expressing their happiness in hearing that the U.S. president was on their side against the clerics.

If such people constitute a majority in Iran, the United States should find ways of helping them in getting rid of the clerics. That would not be an easy task, but it is certainly worth trying.

However, if the U.S. decides to help the youth in Iran, it should make sure that it will succeed in making the youth victorious. Anything else would be catastrophic both for the U.S. and for the oppressed youth in Iran. Anyway, there is still much time to think over the whole thing thoroughly. Iran should be cleansed of the terrorist clergymen and their theocracy without having to go to war against Iran.

A Home for the Kurds
By Ali Ferda Sevin, February 27, 2002-Now that the war against international terrorism is winding down in Afghanistan it is only beginning elsewhere. Iraq seems to be the next target for the US but no one else seems willing to tackle Saddam Hussein with the possible exception of Britain's Tony Blair. Iranians, after having fought an 8-year war to fend off Saddam's aggression against them don't want him removed from his self-declared post as "President for Life" to all Iraqis. The Mullahs figure Iran would be in the bull's eye next time George W. Bush takes aim at the "Axis of Evil." The French, who never miss an opportunity to appease a bully, are intrinsically opposed to bloodying the bully of Baghdad. Even Turkey, our only trusted ally in the region, has been against any disruption of the Iraqi regime that might result in Iraqi Kurds gaining their independence from Saddam Hussein.

Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, in his recent visit to Washington, told President Bush that disruption of the Hussein government would not be good for Turkey. For sure, it would be bad for the Turkish economy, which is already in deep trouble. But Ecevit was also concerned that it would result in Iraqi Kurds gaining their independence. He fears this would encourage Turkish Kurds to want the same from Turkey. Syria and Iran are also afraid Kurdish nationalism may hitch a ride on our war against terrorism to claim pieces of their territory for a Kurdish state in the region to unite all the Kurds in their own homeland called Kurdistan.

Turkey has already shouldered a huge economic burden due to the trade embargo imposed on Iraq. This has eased a bit recently as the Turkish / Iraqi border has become more porous but it is still a very heavy load for one nation to carry for the benefit of the entire coalition that sent Saddam's armed forces back to their barracks from their adventure in Kuwait. The real beneficiaries of the cross border trade have been the Iraqi Kurds who enjoy protection from Saddam, thanks to air patrols flying from the Incirlik air base in Turkey. There is no doubt that any move to depose Saddam will result in a sharp blow to the Turkish economy, at least for the short run.

How soon the economy might recover from the shock of deposing Saddam will depend on how quickly Iraqis can develop democratic institutions to run their own country by the ballot box instead of letting bullets from the bully of Baghdad run it for them. What will replace the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein is the fundamental question. There was no satisfactory answer to this question back in 1991 when The United Nations sanctioned the coalition forces only to the extent of pushing Saddam out of Kuwait but no further. The uncertainty of what might follow the demise of Saddam, is what led the coalition forces to heed the UN resolution and stop in their tracks after defeating the Iraqis. They could have taken Baghdad. But then what? Did we have the stomach to run a synthetic country for who knows how long until it could become a productive member of civilization in the 21st century? In the end, we decided to settle for the inspection regime imposed by The United Nations to keep Saddam from developing weapons of mass destruction instead of moving on to Baghdad and taking him down.

Well, Saddam has thumbed his nose at the UN inspectors from the beginning and became more and more intransigent as time went by. Facing increasingly weak-kneed opposition from the appeasement-minded Europe and the ineptitude of the Clinton foreign policy team, Saddam finally kicked out the inspectors all together even though he had signed a treaty submitting to the inspection regime when he lost the war he started to invade Kuwait. For three years now, he has been free to develop any weapon of mass destruction he desires or import it from any exporter who is willing. A piece of paper signed by an outlaw is not worth a bucket of warm spit, as an old cowboy might say. It is time to put Saddam's heels to the fire and hold him to his signature on the peace treaty he signed when he lost The Gulf War.

When challenged by a determined foe, a bully retreats unless he happens to be suicidal. The "Axis of Evil" speech by President Bush, that gave the hand-wringing European appeasers sweaty palms, has already produced the desired result. Saddam is suddenly desperate to welcome the inspectors back in. What the inspectors can find in Iraq is another question. After three years of seclusion from our prying eyes, there is no telling where Saddam may have hidden his weapons of mass destruction.Even before Saddam kicked out the inspectors, he had declared some 80 sites out of bounds for the inspectors declaring them to be his personal residences. The treaty he signed exempted his private property from inspection and he took full advantage of the loophole. President Bush has the White House and Camp David, provided by the American taxpayers, and he has his own ranch in Texas. If three is enough for the president of 280 million strong United States, three domiciles should be plenty for a despot ruler of some 20 million people. It was a mistake to let Saddam get away with that subterfuge. This time around, we must do better.

If we send inspectors to Iraq, we must insist on new rules to govern their jurisdiction. They must be free to go in at any time they deem appropriate without prior notice. They should be free to go anywhere in Iraq to inspect even if it turns out to be Saddam's bedroom. In the meanwhile, we should help those in Iraq who crave self rule through free elections to attain their goal. If they happen to be Kurds in the north, Sunnis in the middle and the Shiite in the south, so be it. Three legitimate countries created from the grass roots of their people will be much better for their neighbors and for world peace in general, than a synthetic country ruled by a dictator who is a constant irritant in his neighborhood.

Turkey should have no fear of loosing territory to a Kurdistan that may result from breaking up Iraq. Iraq is a synthetic country. It was one of the Arab countries artificially created by the victors of World War I when they broke up the Ottoman Empire. Iraqis had no say in drawing their own borders.

The Turks, on the other hand, did not passively accept the piece of Anatolian territory they were given by the victors. They fought a fierce battle of independence against the victors of World War I to secure what they considered to be the Turkish homeland after the Ottoman Sultan had surrendered his empire by signing the Sevres Treaty in 1920. By 1923 the Turks had expelled the invading forces, created The Turkish Republic and set its borders by the Treaty of Lausanne, which nullified the Treaty of Sevres. Since the people of Iraq had no say in founding the Iraqi State and setting its borders in the beginning, they should be given that opportunity now.

The Supreme Evil?
By Bruce Fein*-Speaking through Secretary of State Colin Powell, United States President George Bush has marked Iraq under arch-tyrant Saddam Hussein as the world's supreme villain. Iran and North Korea, according to Mr. Bush, deserve only honorable mention on an axis of evil. Thus, overthrowing President Hussein by any feasible means, including military force, is now a red hot option clamoring for President Bush's sanction.

But placing Iraq next after Afghanistan in the international cross hairs of the United States seems misconceived. Iran seems more problematic both for America and the Middle East

The United States, despite bestriding the world like a colossus unprecedented in the history of civilization, confronts limits on its coercive capabilities, including military, economic, political and psychological. That recognition requires presidents to conduct the grisly business of differentiating among the countless loathsome evils abroad in allocating the nation's national security resources. It is akin to the grimness of triage. No evil should be treated with nonchalance or indifference. But choices as to which to attack or to mitigate must be made as concessions to the feasible and the greatest good for the greatest number. Intrinsic to such decisions is the inevitability of unwilling innocent martyrs. For example, the United States war against Taliban and Al Qaeda has emancipated millions of oppressed Afghan men, women and children whose eyes have danced and twinkled at the arrival of American soldiers; yet the laudable liberation has also occasioned a small number of unintended deaths of Afghan civilians whose lives may have been morally irreproachable.

Saddam Hussein's adventurism, malevolence, and savagery justify a strong United States response. Human rights and mercy in Iraq are denied even the occasional cameo appearances they make in Communist China. Moreover, President Hussein has unleashed chemical warfare against Iraqi Kurds and Iran. He invaded Kuwait in 1990 lusting for its oil and gas. Ten years earlier, he renounced a boundary treaty with Iran to excuse warring against its neighbor. He flagrantly violated Iraq's nuclear transparency obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency, and persists in flouting Iraq's Persian Gulf peace agreement with the United Nations Security Council that requires international inspections of facilities suspected of implication in weapons of mass destruction. He harbors terrorists such as Abu Nidal and terrorist organizations hostile to Middle East peace. He visits death, pestilence and misery on the 20 million civilian Iraqi population by diverting billions of dollars in permitted oil and sister revenues from humanitarian spending to the construction of extravagant Taj Mahals and opulence for himself, family, and partners in thuggery. Only the no-fly zones imposed and enforced by the United States and Britain and the nearby presence of the United States troops prevents President Hussein from genocide of Iraqi Kurds in the north and Iraqi Shiites in the south. Finally, Saddam plotted an assassination of President Bush's father that was foiled only because of United States intelligence. On the other hand, Saddam's vileness has been largely confined to Iraq since the Persian Gulf war. His sleepless quest to acquire weapons of mass destruction has been seemingly thwarted. His support for international terrorism seems less pronounced than that of Iran. The United States has confessed to no evidence of Saddam's complicity in the September 11 terrorism horrors. Thus, why should the United States escalate its already formidable military and economic opposition to Saddam's regime at the expense of fighting other squalid enemies? That question is especially arresting becaus whether overthrowing President Hussein would advance American anti-terrorism, human rights interests requires consideration of the probable aftermath. Experience teaches the absence of ceilings on the wicked or satanic. Thus, Taliban's fanatically repressive rule in Afghanistan proved worse than the 1979 Soviet invasion in support of its Communist puppet regime. Seeing the immediacy of the Soviet evil, however, the United States championed the fractious and intolerant Afghan rebel forces without serious consideration of their capacity for enlightened government. The rebels thus midwifed Taliban after three years of bloody, convulsive, and anarchic rule, thus giving birth to a new evil for which the United States paid many times over on last 9/11.

The prospects for a non-trivial improvement in Iraq with an American orchestrated ouster of Saddam seems bleak. The Talabani and Barzani small-mindedness and cult-like enmities in the Kurdish north seem incorrigible despite unwearied efforts by the United States to pluck democracy and unity from the twin factions. Iraq's Shiite population in the south has shown no greater affinity for human rights or the rule of law. The Iraqi National Congress, which has cleverly wheeled millions from the United States coffers, commands less popular support than does Enron in Houston. Iraq's subjugated Turkomans can recite chapter and verse on that score. Furthermore, Iraq's political culture and customs have never featured a nanosecond of democracy since its emergence as a kingly nation under a British protectorate from the post-World War I ruins of the Ottoman Empire. Additionally, the United States as renounced any long-term military occupation of a post-Saddam Iraq to cultivate a representative government devoted to human rights and peace as was done in post-World War II West Germany and Japan.

In sum, the best educated guess and that is the best that can be hoped for in speculating about human affairs-is that a United States sponsored overthrow of President Hussein would be followed by a new edition of the same evil like North Korea after Kim Il Sung, Indonesia after Suharto, Iran after Khomeini, or the Congo after Mobutu. That hunch may be wrong. Spain after Franco, South Korea after Park Chung Hee, Taiwan after Chiang Kai Sheik, and Portugal after Salazar flowered quickly into democracies after protracted authoritarian governments. But momentous decisions of the United States, like attacking Iraq to overthrow President Hussein, must pivot on strong probabilities of what will ultimately be achieved, not remote possibilities, to justify the enormous sacrifices in the balance. And the most persuasive probability is that the contemplated anti-Saddam game is not worth the candle.

Iran, however, presents a different case, a topic to be explored in the next issue of the Turkish Times.

*Constitutional Scholar Bruce Fein is a well-known media commentator and an ATAA Adjunct Scholar.

Turkish-U.S. Ties: Still Needed
By Robert Strausz-Hupe, The World and I ,Sep. 1990 - Napoleon is reported to have said that the foreign policy of a state is contained in its geography. If the history of any state bears out this maxim, it Turkey's.

Turkey stands athwart the Dardanelles and the Bosporus straits. Approximately 60 percent of the Soviet Union's maritime commerce and at least one-tenth of the Soviet navy have to pass through those straits to reach the Mediterranean and the blue water beyond.

Extending far to the east, Turkey has land border with the USSR, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, It stands between the USSR and the Middle East and on the flank of potential Soviet invasion routes into Iran and Southwest Asia. To the west it borders Bulgaria and Greece.

Given its geostrategic "tough neighborhood,'' Turkey has been of vital importance to NATO and the West, just as Turkey has relied on U.S. and NATO support, Irrespective of changes in world politics, the potential of Russian aggression has been for centuries a fact of life for Turkey.

President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia, an eloquent playwright who addressed the U.S. Congress recently, captured the imaginations of many when he touched on the themes of change, saying that "the Second World War and its unhappy consequences are finally coming to an end.''

While the pace of this change is almost mind-boggling, one thing is evident: We are at a crossroad but cannot see clearly what awaits us during the next stage of the journey. Welcome as events in the Soviet Union may be, change there does not necessarily promote stability in the countries surrounding Turkey. Although the threat of Soviet attack may be reduced, regional conflicts and upheavals may well increase.

Our recent and not altogether reassuring experiences with Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Syria suggest a continued need for common Western security arrangements, though perhaps in a different from. The takeover by the Turkish army in September 1980 was triggered by violent and nationwide political conflict that was supported, and in part instigated, by foreign governments.

Varied Threats
We may assume that the kind of conflict that could again threaten Turkey, and in turn other allies, is not a medium- or long-range unclear attack or a massive land invasion from the USSR. The possibilities of armed conflict in the region, however, are as varied as they are alarming: Guerrilla war in urban and rural areas; gas attacks on civilians in neighboring countries; turmoil in the southern USSR; revolutionary change in southeastern Europe; and threats to Western oil links, including pipelines through and near Turkey. All these crises may erupt at one. Any one by itself would be enough to require continuing the military modernization programs that have been under way with U.S. assistance for many years. Turkey has not been able to relax its strategic stance just because the countries surrounding it are in flux. Turkey's guard of the straits that control access to the only Soviet warm-water ports is a constant of Turkish foreign policy. It is not a matter of choice. The Turkish-Soviet border may now be less tense from NATO's standpoint, but it has not gotten any shorter.

Despite improved East-West relations, Soviet military capabilities have not diminished significantly, and much as we may wish Mikhail Gorbachev success in remaking his society, we must remain attentive to the possibility of a change in leadership or a reversal of reform.

Motivated by domestic political reasons, Congress has declined to supply Turkey with the support necessary to even approach alliance standard. Paradoxically, now that the NATO-wide threat is reduced, the more affluent allies will be less able to meet the needs of Turkey, the poorest of NATO's members. Destructive and pointless as was the Iran-Iraq War, it forged two large, experienced, battle-hardened armies with recent combat experience that stand to Turkey's east. No other member of NATO can say that of its neighbors.

As Soviet troops and equipment withdraw from Eastern Europe, some soldiers will go home and the oldest equipment will go the scrap heap. The newest will remain, to be shifted further eastward and southward. Turkey has not been magically transformed into a western flank country; it remains the southeast flank.

Turkey, with 800 miles of Syrian border and more than 600 miles of Iranian and Iraqi border, is both a strategic outpost and a diplomatic gateway. Turkey was able to maintain a policy of regional neutrality and play the role of honest broker at times in the Iran-Iraq conflict. No other Western ally had that capacity.

Yet, unlike the other frontline NATO countries, which will benefit from the reduction in Soviet troops and equipment close to their frontiers. Turkey remains exposed to Soviet military power that, though it might be diminished, still poses a very real threat for the foreseeable future. For Turkey, this,, too, is not a matter of choice but rather an immutable geographic condition. Nor can Turkey alter the fact that its 54 million inhabitants form the core of the Turkic people and that more than 42 million Turkic Muslims, whose culture and language are related to those of the Turkish Republic, live in the Soviet Union.

Turkey ranks third after Israel and Egypt as a recipient of U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits, loans, and Military Assistance Program grants. In Turkey's equipment and the ongoing threat that the country faces suggest current levels of aid are still inadequate for current needs.

Consistently, congressional opposition to Turkish aid has impeded administration efforts to raise assistance levels. This can be attributed to a variety of factors, all of them detrimental to U.S. national security. The continued application of the 7-to-10 ratio for military aid to Greece and Turkey, which was inserted into 1986 legislation at the insistence of the Greek lobby, certainly heads the list. Turkey has rightly and vociferously objected to this formula as breaching our "best efforts'' pledge in U.S.-Turkish defense agreements. It is seen by Turkey as a chronic, ethnic-based disapproval of Turkey's policies, despite executive branch assurances of American friendship and commitment to Turkey. Reduced aid has slowed Turkey's modernization program, weakened its defenses, and forced Turkey to starve important defense programs.

No Going Back
Turkey's past is immensely complex. The Ottoman Empire consisted of many pieces of odd shape, skillfully assembled, smashed to pieces, and put together again. Compared to the Ottoman past, the present is much simpler and is likely to stay so. The past is veiled by prejudice, romance, and distortions, but one thing is quite sure: Turkey will never be able to go back to it. Turkey is condemned to be a modern state, secular and democratic. So the future is quite clear: Turkey will have to become a Western-type secular, high-tech, free-enterprise society. For this, the past is no guide; Turkey must fashion its own future. So far, it has been doing quite well.

Turkey's troubles--gross inequalities of individual wealth; steep inflation; an overtaxed educational system; unemployment aggravated by uncontrolled population growth; paucity of occupational training; and, in the cities, a churning mass of young people whose expectations, stirred by the media, have grown much faster than the job market--are the troubles of all countries on the threshold of modernity. Although America is not spared these problems of growth, it can meet the costs of solving them. Turkey cannot.

And here we come to the heart of the matter: U.S. foreign and security policies have been, and are likely to remain, crucially important to the political and economic development of Turkey. The migh-have-beens of international politics are countless. But who could have foreseen in, say, 1945, that the United States would embrace Turkey as its most important ally in the region? Nevertheless, for 30 years, U.S. military forces have stood on Turkish soil, American agencies have gathered intelligence from Turkish military forces. As a consequence, Turkish society has tilted toward the American model. America has replaced France and Britain as the most attractive sample of Western civilization. Blue jeans have won the battle of popular fashion. The Turkish-American connection has been institutionalized.

To this day, a speaker at an official Turkish-American get-together, however dull he might be, is assured of his audience's respectful applause as long as he does not forget to acclaim--as have countless speakers before him--the close affinity of the two nations' characters and manners. The two peoples, so the legend goes, have more in common with one another than they have with other peoples, notably the standoffish members of the European Community (EC). On the face of it, this claim is about as valid as are most generalizations about international relations. Most Americans and Turks, insofar as they become aware of each other's existence, are likely to get along with one another and, both being citizens of multiethnic societies, to approach one another without racial bias, the ugliest of all international animosities.

In the last five years, about one-half of the approximately $500 million allocated by the U.S. government annually to modernizing the Turkish armed forces has gone into the manufacture of the F-16 fighter plane. This Turkish-American cooperative undertaking, though it does not produce this excellent plane quite as cheaply as does the parent company in the United States, produces it in Turkey under joint management. The bulk of the Turkish armed forces' weapons are made in America or produced to U.S. specifications. Turkey has gotten used to this arrangement, which is the centerpiece of its bid for technological modernization and competitive status on world markets.

On the debit side, Turkey has come to rely on the U.S. government's contribution in arms and finance as if it were regular, natural event and--perhaps even more insidiously--Turkey's due for services rendered. But this is another matter that needs to be viewed in the wider context of U.S. alliance policies worldwide.

In his previous job as prime minister, President Turgut Ozal succeeded in some of his grand plans for the liberation of Turkey's economy from the deadweight of mercantilism. Yet not all of the apathy, obstinacy, and indolence of Ottoman rule, which invariably got the better of reformers, has been leached out of contemporary Turkish society. Unlike Japan and its East Asian free-market neighbors. Turkey has not come to terms with its histories. While the former kept no more of their history than suited their pursuit of modernity, Turkey has been much slower and less summary in making tradition rhyme with modernization -or is it Americanization?

After World War II, the United States guided the education of Japan's and West Germany's post-World War II Generations. Turkey, undefeated and never occupied, chose to maintain a more distant and more qualified relationship with the victors.

The Turks believe themselves to be a unique people. Most people, Americans included, are quite sure that they are. Not withstanding their high degree of national egocentrism, the Turks can justly claim that their case is unique, both in world politics and as a historical dilemma. Here and now, the Turks are governing the Western way ; but the final returns--a Turkey locked into the EC, the bitter regional conflicts resolved, and rampant inflation vanquished--are not yet in. Intelligent, patient, and tough, the Turkish people are likely to shed the burden of the Ottoman past and to take their rightful place in the Western community. Although only Turks can do the job, we can help them do it.

NATO still Important
The road to democratization is fraught with uncertainties. As the yoke of tyranny is lifted, ethnic and religious tensions are bound to erupt. National borders are now being challenged, while new identities are being forged based on religious, ethnic, cultural, and national allegiances.

Until the democratic reforms in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are institutionalized, until regional ethnic tensions and nationalistic conflicts abate, NATO will serve, as it so brilliantly did in the past, as the bulwark of democracy.

The Turks believe their membership in NATO should further their European aspirations, especially their desire for membership in the EC. Ozal launched the Turkish application for membership in part to lock in his free-market, export-driven economic reforms. Joining the EC would also build pressure for further democratization in Turkey and fulfill Ataturk's dream of a modern, Western Turkey.

While the Turks hope for a quick decision (that is, before their November 1992 elections) in principle in favor of Turkish membership in the EC, most Turks would be willing to accept a very gradual timetable for actual entry. Turkey's leader have plainly told EC members that outright rejection would force Turkey to reevaluate its policy in all areas, including NATO. The United States and the rest of NATO share an interest in avoiding a confrontation that would undo the achievements of 30 years of alliance cooperation. Clearly, the more closely we can integrate, Turkey with the West, the more likely Turkey will be to develop democratic institutions that will help ensure future stability. Convincing our European allies that Turkish membership would be in their best interest should be high on our diplomatic agenda.

One final factor to keep in mind is that much of the rising productivity and prosperity of Turkey is the fruit of dynamic policies under Ozal's leadership. What counts most for U.S. interests, however, are those policies, not Ozal the man. Fortunately, to a remarkable extent Ozal has set the agenda for his successors. No political party (other than the right-wing fringe Welfare-Refah Party) opposes Turkish membership in NATO or questions Turkey's application for EC membership. Similarly, few argue with Ozal's opening up of the Turkish economy or his insistence on export-led growth. The broad policies of the Ozal years thus stand an excellent chance of continuing to benefit Turkey and its allies.

A strong and friendly Turkey is in our best interests and that of our friends in Europe and the Middle East. No other state holds so strategic a place in the region where fate still hangs in the balance. Indeed, if anything, now is the time to embrace Turkey as friend as ally all the more warmly.

Holokost ve Ermeni olaylari
By Gündüz Aktan, Radikal - Subat 25, 2002 - Bir süre önce Erivan'daki Israil Büyükelçisi Rivka Cohen'in Yahudi soykirimi ile Ermeni olaylari arasinda benzerlik kurulamayacagi yolundaki sözleri büyük tepki uyandirdi. Cohen 'Yahudi soykiriminin önceden planlanan ve bir ulusu yok etmeyi amaçlayan bir eylem olarak tarihte benzersiz oldugunu ve hiçbir olayin bununla karsilastirilamayacagini' belirtti.

Buna karsilik Ermenistan Disisleri Bakani, Israil'e yapacagi ziyareti iptal etti. Disisleri sözcüsüyse 'soykirim yasamis bir ülkenin böyle bir yaklasim içinde olmasini çok ilginç' buldu.

Geçen yil Erivan'daki Ingiliz büyükelçisinin benzer beyanlarindan sonra Ankara'daki Ingiliz Büyükelçiligi'nin yayimladigi bir bildiride de benzer seyler söylenmisti, ama Ermenistan ayni sertlikte karsilik vermemisti. Zira Israil'in bu konudaki tutumu Ermeniler için moral açidan büyük önem tasiyor.

Disisleri Bakani Perez'in Ermeni olaylarini hiçbir sekilde soykirim saymadigi biliniyor. Ayni görüse birkaç kisi hariç hemen tüm Israil kamuoyu odaklarinin katildigi da malum. 1948 Soykirim Sözlesmesi, Yahudi soykirimina göre olusturuldu. Bunun 2. maddesi soykirimi tanimliyor.

Soykirim bir grubun sadece o grup oldugu için, yani toprak ya da bagimsizlik mücadelesi gibi baska bir neden olmadan, önceden planlanarak yok edilmesi demek. Bu yok etme iradesiyse ancak antisemitizm gibi irkçi bir nefretin nihai asamasinda ortaya çikiyor. Oysa Ermeniler 1860'lardan itibaren önce otonomi, sonra da bagimsizlik amaciyla sürekli isyanlar çikardilar. Yari siyasi parti yari komitaci örgütleriyle sik sik terörizme saparak mücadele ettiler. I. Dünya Savasinda Rusya ile isbirligi içinde Türk ordularini arkadan vurdular. Türk sivillere saldirdilar ve katlettiler. Azinlikta olduklari Dogu Anadolu'da etnik temizlikle kendilerine münhasir bir vatan yaratmak istediler. (Hâlâ bu amaci gütmüyorlar mi?) Bazi bakimlardan bir trajediye dönüsen tehcir bu tehditleri önlemek için yapildi.

Buna karsi V. Dadrian, isyanlarin Osmanli baskilarina bir tepki olusturdugunu, o sirada tüm Hiristiyan tebaanin isyan etmekte oldugunu, savas sirasinda Ermenilerin öldürdügü Türklere iliskin rakamlarin içinde savas alaninda ölen askerleri kattigimizi iddia ediyor.

Bu düz mantigin hukukla iliskisi yok. Zira isyanin nedenleri önemli degil. Baskalarinin isyan etmis olmasi da önemsiz. Otonomi veya bagimsizlik amaciyla isyan edilmesi ve düsmanla isbirligi yapilmasina verilen karsilik soykirim kavraminin disinda kaliyor. Bunlari yapanlar siyasi grup sayiliyor. Siyasi grup sözlesme tarafindan korunmuyor. Bu gruba ait siviller öldürülmüsse suç baska bir kategoriye giriyor.

Kaldi ki ayni olaylarda ölen Türklerin sayisi Ermenilerden fazla. Aslinda hem Ermeniler hem biz bu rakamlari Alman kaynaklarindan aliyoruz. Savas sirasinda 2.5 milyon Türk öldü. Savas alaninda 500 bin kaybimiz var. Geriye kalan 2 milyonun yarisindan fazlasi dogu Anadolu'da ölüyor. Bu, Paris Baris Konferansi'na katilan Ermeni delegasyonunca da tekrarlaniyor. Dadrian ise Türk ve Müslüman ölümlerinin Ermenilerden degil de, hastalik, açlik ve zor doga kosullarindan kaynaklandigini iddia ediyor. Garip, Ermeniler ayni nedenlerden ölmüyorlar da biz ölüyoruz. Bu durumda Israil'in itirazini anlamak kolay. Londra'daki bir toplantida soykirima hukuk degil de insan haklari açisindan yaklasan Mark Levene 1950-2000 arasinda 50 soykirim oldugunu söyledi.

Yani belli bir sivil ölümü vukubulan olaylari soykirim saydi. Ayni yaklasimla 1900-1950 arasinda da en az 50 soykirim olmus olmali. Yani bir yüzyilda 100 soykirim. Levene'in imasindan yüzyilin ilk soykiriminin Balkan Savaslari oldugu anlasiliyor. Balkanlar'da bize yapilan etnik temizlik de böylece soykirim oluyor.

14 Subat günü Hürriyet'te Ertugrul Özkök, uluslararasi yarginin Yugoslav milletini degil de Miloseviç'i sahsen suçladigina dikkat çekiyor.

Bazan unutuyoruz: Hukuk soykirimda devlet sorumlulugunu çoktan terk etti. Ermeni davasi sürekli zemin kaybediyor.

Dialogue With the Deaf
By Tunku Varadarajan*, Wall Street Journal, February 22, 2002, ISTANBUL, Turkey-There was an episode to savor here last week, at a meeting of foreign ministers from the European Union and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) -- a body which purports to represent the Islamic world, and which is the only international organization of states defined purely in terms of religion. In a ballroom with radiant views of the Bosphorus, Kamal Kharrazi, the foreign minister of Iran, posed stiffly for a photograph at an evening reception. A dapper, bearded chap, he passed a hand over his chin as a posse of Turkish cameramen edged him closer to a window. Suddenly, one of his minders darted behind Mr. Kharrazi and hustled a waitress out of sight. She was bearing a tray with glasses of wine and would have appeared, alcohol and all, just behind the minister's right shoulder had she stayed in the frame. This, one assumes, would not have gone down well back in Tehran, though the wine, a lively Anatolian red, was going down a treat at the reception -- with momentarily impious Muslims and unbelievers alike.

The beauty of Turkey -- and by this I mean the elegance of its cultural practices -- lies in the fact that it is the only state in the Muslim world audacious enough to convene a conference with more than 40 Islamic foreign ministers present alongside their European counterparts, and then to include the country's leading winemaker and its most popular brewery among the event's sponsors.

This may seem trivial in the grand scheme of things -- and the theme of the two-day conference, "Civilization and Harmony: The Political Dimension," was grandiose indeed -- but it is in these touches of Western custom, these flashes of cultural independence, that one detects the true nature of Turkey's separateness from the ummah, or the Islamic world.

Take another vignette. At Istanbul's Sultanahmet Mosque -- known to Westerners as the "Blue Mosque" -- I was part of a group of visitors approached by the imam. We knew he was the imam only because he told us so, for his aspect -- dark pinstriped suit, white shirt, red floral tie, and the barest designer stubble on his face -- revealed not a hint of his vocation. Nowhere else in the Islamic world (and certainly not in mosques in New York or London) would an imam dress in so cosmopolitan a way while on duty, or have so feeble a beard. What is more, he shook hands with the ladies in our group, and posed for pictures. One woman, a forward type from Germany, asked what seemed an impertinent question: "Sir," she said, with that inimitably Teutonic straightness of face, "you don't mind images?" To which the imam chuckled, then replied: "Madame, this is Turkey."

The imam's repartee was more profound than it might have sounded to his listeners. It laid bare, in a mere phrase, the contours of contemporary Turkish life. In 1924, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk , the founder of modern Turkey, made this observation in a speech to the nation: "Countries may vary, but civilization is one, and for a nation to progress, it must take part in this one civilization. The decline of the Ottomans began when, proud of their triumphs over the West, they cut their ties with the European nations. This was a mistake which we will not repeat." Indeed, Turkish politics, and much of Turkish life, might be described as an anxiously choreographed ballet, with every move measured to ensure that the historic mistake to which Ataturk referred -- to wit, a disregard of Western ways -- is always avoided.

Embedded in the Turkish definition of "modernity" is the belief that the public role of Islam needs to be reduced to a minimum, and that a Muslim society can only thrive, and compete with the rest of the world, when its elemental Muslim tenets are kept in check. In other words, there is an acknowledgment in Turkey -- refreshing in its dispassion, rare in its honesty -- that not all cultures are equal. Some, in fact, are better than others.

Yet at the conference of foreign ministers -- convened to identify the fault lines between the West and the Islamic world, and to promote an intelligent discussion of the ways in which the twain might meet -- there was an almost breathtaking unwillingness to tackle the hard questions. One Western foreign minister after another queued up to pay court to the "tolerance" and "majesty" of the "true Islam," pandering to Islamic sentiment by trotting out all the old clichés of how the West was once wallowing in muck while the Muslim world kept the flame of intellect alight. Ah, Cordoba! And the Islamic representatives, puffed by this fulsome nonsense, responded in kind, showing that, at least in the confection of platitudes, they were the equal of their Western counterparts. So one had to endure speeches that extolled the "Islamic way," and declarations -- such as one by the foreign minister of Bangladesh -- that "people who are terrorists cannot be Muslim, and people who are Muslim cannot be terrorists." This analytical frippery earned the minister great applause, but not as much as followed the pronouncement by the secretary general of the OIC that "we all belong to a big family, the family of monotheism."

The plain truth is that we do not belong to a big family, and that is why the conference was convened in the first place. The problem with the earnest defenders of Islam is that they do not compare like with like when addressing differences in contemporary civilizations. They compare what is actually practiced in the West -- the behavior of Western peoples and institutions -- with an Islamic ideal. This is intellectual speciousness, if not outright dishonesty. But the old ways of international diplomacy -- say nothing harsh, and certainly nothing truthful, lest there be a confrontation -- asserted themselves from the moment the first ministerial mouth was opened for an utterance.

There was, however, no escape from one depressing truth. The cultures of the West and the Islamic world are so far apart that it would seem that even the most basic dialogue -- defined, here, as a clear signposting of ideas, honestly expressed, followed by a process of parsing and analysis -- is impossible. This became clear at a session billed as "Confronting Common Challenges in Today's Environment," a roundtable discussion between two intellectuals from the West and the Islamic world, and two Islamic ministers. The Western thinker was Bernard Lewis, professor emeritus at Princeton and the Occident's preeminent scholar of the Islamic world. His Muslim counterpart was Hassan Hanafi, chairman of the philosophy department at Cairo University, regarded in his own milieu as the leading philosopher in the Islamic world. If Mr. Hanafi is the best that his world has to offer, I am ready to weep. Speaking of Sept. 11, he said: "The West is responsible for fundamentalism. Modernization equals Westernization, equals Americanization. There was a reaction to this." He then claimed that "a clash of civilizations is alien to the Muslim world, where we have always championed the dialogue of civilizations."

As he twittered on, I could see Mr. Lewis on stage, brow furrowed, thinking, Dear God, where am I? Gamely, when his turn came, he stressed that "there are many civilizations, and have been through history, but there's only one modernity." But he was talking to the deaf, one of whom was Amre Moussa, secretary general of the League of Arab States, who declared later that "the people who carried out the Sept. 11 attack do not represent Islam, just as the Baader Meinhof doesn't represent Germany or the Red Brigade Italy."

Neither group claimed to speak for Germany or Italy in the way that al Qaeda claims to speak for Islam. Yet this point was lost on Mr. Moussa, and this failure of analogical reasoning, so common among so many Muslim interlocutors, is part of a general intellectual calamity in the Islamic world. That world, with the valiant exception of Turkey , has yet to graduate from self-pity to self-criticism, and unless its spokesmen and thinkers are able to know themselves, there is no hope that they may ever be able to know the West.

*Mr. Varadarajan is the Journal's deputy editorial features editor.

E.U.'s Action Does Not Befit a Friend
"Why does the EP use the Kurdish and Armenian cards against Turkey?"
By Rahim Er, Turkiye - Yesterday [Friday, March 1] the European Parliament decided to accept the Armenian allegations. Furthermore, acting upon the 'Human Rights in Turkey' issue it suggested that we not shut down the People's Democratic Party (HADEP). Our judicial organs have the final say on the issue as the rule of law prevails in Turkey. Turkish intellectuals believe that political parties, which were not involved in terrorism, whatever their tendency may be, should not be closed down. In fact, the closure of these parties serves no purpose. Turkish intellectuals suggested that HADEP should become a political party instead of a representative for one ethnic group. Intellectuals of Kurdish origin also accept the correctness of this approach.

However, whatever its purpose, the European Parliament (EP) is applying double standards on the issue. While representatives belonging to other European parties are being tried, the EP takes no notice of this. It should not ignore any of them, but should not intervene either. Politics and law should not be mixed. These are Turkey's internal problems. Such considerations lead us to ask does the EP want anti-EU currents in Turkey to gain strength? Is it the duty of the EP to dredge up historical events using the groundless allegations of one side, or rather to act with moderation in supporting peace? If such a decision does not foster any secret goal for the future, what purpose will it serve apart from deepening old grudges? When some Hinchak or Tashnak militants shed blood, fury will rise in Turkey.

Almost a century has passed since the incidents that are alleged. The regimes have changed. No one approves of genocide, whatever the cause or whoever the perpetrator. Yesterday Turks did not approve of it, nor do they approve of it today, nor will they do so tomorrow. When the situation can be summarized thus, why does the EP use the Kurdish and Armenian cards against Turkey? Turks in Turkey have no problems with either citizens of Kurdish or Armenian descent. We have lived on the same territories for centuries and will continue to do so. There is no need for intervention from abroad. Furthermore, these actions do not seem to bear goodwill towards Turkey. This all makes one wonder if the EU wants Turkey as a member or not.