Preserving But Not Destroying Democracy
By Bruce Fein - Every democratic nation must struggle with preservation of its character from internal and external threats while avoiding its own destruction. In mature democracies like the United States and Great Britain, the struggle is more theoretical than practical because of virtual universal enthusiasm for both the written and unwritten rules of the game. There are no anti-constitutional political parties in America coiled to overturn its centuries old democratic dispensation. Despite the verbal pyrotechnics that greeted the United States Supreme Court decision catapulting George Bush into the White House from the shoulders of Florida's 25 electoral votes, only a sub-microscopic crumb of popular unwillingness to accept him as the legitimate President of the United States emerged.

Turkey, in contrast, is not indissolubly wedded to democracy. Centuries of Ottoman rule were no training period for government by the consent of the governed of freedom of expression. During Ataturk's years, democracy was more championed from above than demanded from below. Political dissent was generally suppressed, not welcomed as a hallmark of popular government. Islam, moreover, does not readily lend itself to democratic practices and idioms. It recognizes no demarcation boundary between religion and state, which places the rule of law in perpetual peril. Muftis and Imams are not popularly elected through secret ballot or otherwise.

These are reasons why Ataturk insisted on a secular constitution and the abolition of the Caliphate. If religious edicts trump non-discriminatory and evenhandedly applied secular statutes, the result is mayhem far removed from civilization. For instance, religiously motivated assassinations or robberies against the likes of Salmon Rushdie, women sans head scarves or consanguineous male escorts, men sans beards, or non-Muslims wearing crucifixes could be perpetrated with impunity. Iran today is powerful evidence of the fundamental incompatibility of marrying Islam to secularism in fashioning institutions of government and the rule of law, like trying to square the circle.

Turkey's young democracy faces vexing challenges on two fronts. A non-trivial number of Muslim zealots would substitute Sharia for Turkey's secularism by erosion from within and constitutional perfidy. That was the worrisome threat raised by erstwhile Welfare Party chief and Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. He was thus shoved from office to save a clear and serious danger to Turkey's democratic trappings, albeit through troubling pseudo-constitutional means. The Welfare Party was banned, as was its second edition, the Virtue Party.

Turkey also confronts Kurdish secessionist and terrorist sentiments. This menace to the constitution has substantially receded in recent years, but has not yet been extinguished. Pending is request to the constitutional court to close Turkey's only pro-Kurdish political party, HADEP, as a front for the terrorist PKK, similar to the Sinn Fein party in Northern Ireland operating as the political arm of the terrorist Irish Republican Army. Whether HADEP's threat to democracy justifies its outlawry is emblematic of the agonizing dilemma of attempting to preserve and deepen Turkey's democratic character without laying the seeds for its ultimate destruction. Who knows with any reasonable degree of confidence whether a spark might ignite an anti-democratic conflagration? History is no guiding North Star. Adolph Hitler's Nazi party rocketed into domination of the parliament from virtual insignificance in 1929 to an impressive plurality by 1932 during the Weimar Republic. Hitler's antipathy towards democratic institutions were obvious. He had championed a failed "Beer Hall" coup in 1923, and employed a private army of thugs, the Brown Shirts or SA, to kill and intimidate political opponents. Hitler was appointed as Chancellor in 1933 according to constitutional norms, but then instantly abandoned Weimar in favor of hideous dictatorship. Who would dispute that Weimar officials were derelict and unfaithful to its own democracy in refusing to outlaw the Nazis? Indeed, even today, when Germany's democratic roots are firmly established and Hitler culturally discredited, neo-Nazi parties are illegal, Mein Kampf is prohibited, and possession of Nazi insignia and emblems are criminal. In Algeria, an Islamic party, FIS, was perched to capture a second round of elections in the 1990s. The Government of Algeria, whose democratic credentials were razor thin, canceled the balloting fearful of a Khomeini-like revolution. Terrorism, which was already bedeviling the country, climbed exponentially. Political dissent had no other reasonable outlet. Algeria's terrorism victims have surged past 100,000. Banning FIS thus seems to have aggravated than mitigated Algeria's gruesome convulsions. On the other hand, if the Islamic Front had grasped the reigns of power, things might be even more bleak in Algeria.

Burma, on the other hand, demonstrates the hazards to democracy of entrusting government with power to strangle opposition parties. In 1990, Nobel Peace prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy attracted an astonishing 80 percent of the popular vote despite a military cabal's threats and intimidation. The vote was invalidated by the military leaders because the NLD would likely have imprisoned and pauperized them for gross human rights violations.

The Government of Turkey thus faces no easy task in sensibly differentiating between legitimate and illegitimate political opposition. Incumbents officeholders are prone to exaggerate dangers to the constitutional order because they crave retention in power. Moreover, to prohibit a party that eschews open violence may drive its members into the hands of extremists, thus occasioning a self-fulfilling prophecy. Probably the best that can be said is for Turkey to proceed with caution. A political party that professes lawful means and ends should be proscribed only by clear and convincing evidence before the constitutional court that its ultimate objective is destruction of the democratic order.

Suspect parties should enjoy a right to cross-examine their accusers, and trials should be open and secret evidence prohibited absent a government showing of a clear and imminent danger to the national security. And a two-thirds vote by the constitutional court should be required to sustain a banning order.

Constitutional scholar Bruce Fein is a nationally syndicated media personality and ATAA's Adjunct Scholar.

The Foreign Policy of Ataturk Concerning the Turkish World
By Ercan Karakoc, Gökmen Kilicoglu - Today, Atatürk is known as a leader who was primarily interested in domestic politics, yet he also held many strong views about the Turkish existence outside of the borders of the Republic he founded. Atatürk, who himself was born outside the present borders of the Turkish Republic, keenly followed the period's political and ideological trends, allowing him to develop a certain foresight about which economic and social-political strategy would work or fail. As a part of his personal development, Atatürk made a concerted effort to use the day's available resources to concentrate on the historical and cultural ties between Turkey and the Turkish peoples who lived outside the new nation's borders. He also took great affront to the plight of Turkish communities and Republics when they were faced with attacks and threats in the first quarter of the 20th Century.

As a dynamic people, the Turks spread out from Central Asia (Turkestan) to many lands in the world and during this expansion established many states. In this study, we will use the term "Turkish World" to describe those Turks who lived outside the national borders of the Turkish Republic following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and Turkish peoples living in Central Asia and the Caucasus such as the Ozbeks, Turkmens, Uygurs, Tatars, Azeris, Karakalpaks, Kirgiz and Kazak Turks.

The failure of Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism as a tool to keep the Empire intact directed Ottoman intellectuals and officers towards the concept of Pan-Turkism. However, the unrealistic and adventurous implementation of such a policy by the leaders of the Ittihad and Terakki [Union and Progress] Party, especially Enver Pasha, not only failed, but also speeded up the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. After analyzing why these three philosophies had failed, Atatürk settled on more realistic and attainable policies. After the establishment of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal based his policies on a cultural union among Turks and he demonstrated these tendencies via his application of a common cultural policy. He first realized the necessity of institutionalizing "Turkishness." He thus found the Turkish Language Institute and the Turkish History Institute. By means of these institutions, Turkish history and culture could be researched deeply and academically.

Atatürk devoted his life to the Turkish nation, felt proud of being a Turk and lived his life as a Turkish nationalist. In an introspective moment, Atatürk said the following about his roots, '"When I first read the works of poet Mehmet Emin Yurdakul, I was a student at the Manastir Military High School. The first time I felt pride in my national identity was when I first read his poem that begins with the lines 'I am a Turk, my religion, my race is blessed'. Yet, I truly reached this plateau when I was serving in the army. At the time I witnessed an Arab Major, slapping an Anatolian boy because he had raised his voice to another Arabian soldier, as I watched him swallow his pride and hold back his tears. It was then that I truly understood and felt what it was to be a Turk. From that day forth my Turkishness was a source of my deepest pride and inspiration". And he added, "In my life, my only sole wealth is my being a Turk."

As part of his belief in the existence of a natural and sociological ethnic bond and connections amongst Turkish peoples living outside Turkey's border, Atatürk highlighted this conviction when he said: "Turkey must above all concern itself with the cultural issues of those Turks outside of Turkey. In this way we are implementing a constructive approach to the Turkish cause. We attach great importance not only to all various sources of the Turkish language, but also to its wealth of dialects and many great literary works. We do not even overlook the Turkic dialects and cultures of those Turks who live beyond Lake Baikal …

Atatürk's policy concerning the Turkish World was based on the principles of realism, pragmatism and for neither being passive, nor adventurous. Above all, Atatürk desired that all humanity live in peace and welfare, embodied by one of his most well known statements "Peace at Home, peace in the World." He built solid links with Turkish peoples living outside the borders of the nation and during his lifetime he never forgot their problems and plight. With a keen eye to the ever-changing world situation, Atatürk formulated a realistic foreign policy about the Turkish World. The best example of this kind of intelligent and measured policy is one that led to the Hatay (Antakya) region's joining Turkey.

When we evaluate the diplomatic efforts of the 1920s and 1930s to repatriate Hatay into Turkey's borders, we see this as a perfect example of Atatürk's Foreign Policy. In May 1, 1920, Mustafa Kemal gave a speech in Turkish Grand National Assembly where he said: "One of our foremost principles is the fact that our nation' border will pass South of Alexandretta. In the East, this border stretches to include Mosul, Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah. Those are our national borders." Thus setting out a clear goal that in Hatay's case was ultimately achieved. Another example of the importance that Atatürk attached to Hatay was when on 15 March 1923 he told a young girl in Adana who had emotionally said: "Father of our nation, please save us" that: "Lands that have been Turkish for 40 centuries will not remain in the hands of the enemy." One of the most interesting aspects of the process of Hatay's joining Turkey was the incapability of France, one of the biggest states of this period, to stop this and its need to ask for help from her mandate, Syria, when Hatay's local parliament voted in favor of joining Turkey. In this example we see in Atatürk a man of vision demonstrating knowledge of both the real power and capacity of his nation and also an ability to see beyond temporary political and military success. He took a bold risk that turned out in Turkey's favor. In addition, he proved that lands that were left outside of Turkey's borders by the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 could in fact be re-integrated.

In a speech he gave at the social club of Ziraat Bank in Ankara on the 10th Anniversary of the Republic in September 29 1923, Atatürk said perhaps his most prophetic and visionary statement of all. "Today the Soviet Union is a friend and an ally. We need this friendship. However, no one can know what will happen tomorrow. Just like the Ottoman and Austro-Hungrian Empires it may tear itself apart or shrink in size. Those peoples that it holds so tightly in its grip may one day slip away. The world may see a new balance of power. It is then that Turkey must know what to do. The Soviets have under their control our brothers with whom we share language, beliefs and roots.

We must be prepared to embrace them. Being ready does not mean that we will sit quietly and wait. We must get ready. How does a people get prepared for such an endaveour? By strengthening the natural bridges that exist between us. Language is a bridge... Religon is a bridge... History is a bridge... We must delve into our roots and reconstruct what history has divided. We can`t wait for them to approach us. We must reach out to them ..." Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, October 29, 1933.

Atatürk was also closely interested in the island of Cyprus. After the treaty of Lausanne, Cyprus remained outside of Turkey's borders. Atatürk showed the value he held for Cyprus in two separate statements. First, during a military exercise in the South, Atatürk asked his officers a variety of questions concerning supply lines and military preparedness. After hearing a range of answers, Atatürk told his officers that "with Cyprus in enemy hands, all their plans were for naught, he then added that the island would need watching and that it was important for Turkey." Then, later, during the period when Hatay was getting set to join the Republic, in a conversation with Saffet Engin, a Turkish Cypriot, he told him: "Don't worry, Saffet Bey, its turn will come." Meanwhile, when the island's Turkish population began to migrate from the island to Anatolia he immediately stopped it. In return he provided educational facilities and fellowships for students, he established an Association to help and solve the problems of Turkish Cypriots, and he gave financial support to two Turkish newspapers in Cyprus, Ses and Soz. Atatürk, believing that the Turkish language in Cyprus should not be allowed to fade and after reforming the alphabet in Turkey, had the Turkish Government pays for two new printing presses from Germany. In addition, he sent the educational ship of the Naval Academy, the Hamidiye Zirhlisi, to encourage the national identity and consciousness of the Turkish people living on the island.

In addition and despite the hardships facing the Turks during the War of Independence, Atatürk sent food supplies to Crimean Tatars when they were on the verge of a famine and he not only brought leading Gagavuz Turkish students from Romania to furnish them with better educational possibilities but also sent Turkish teachers to teach those who remained behind. In the 1920's, he entered into diplomatic negotiations with the superpower of that period, England, to repatriate Mosul and Kirkuk, he also ordered the Turkish Army to be ready for any war and told those Turks living in that area that: "the sun would once again shine on them" However, because of both Kurdish and the radical Islamic rebellions of Sheik Sait in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia in 1925 his efforts for reclaiming Mosul and Kirkuk failed.

There are many more examples of Atatürk's policy concerning the Turkish World. His realistic strategy was based both on avoiding dragging the young Turkish Republic into danger again and on not consuming the energy of a tired nation for goals that were unattainable in the short term. But this did not mean that he followed passive and ineffectual policies. As one may see in the Hatay case, he reached his goal in a step-by-step fashion. His long-term targets were clearly outlined in the aforementioned speech he gave to the Turkish Youth on the 10th Anniversary of Turkish Republic.

In conclusion, Atatürk's foreign policy was balanced and based on an analytical evaluation of international dynamics. The Balkan Treaty in 1934, the Montreaux Treaty in 1936 and the Sadabat Treaty in 1937 and a favorable conclusion to the Hatay Question in 1939 exemplify the success of his policy.

Ercan Karakoc and Gokmen Kilicoglu are research assistants at the Gebze Institute of Technology and currently interning at the Assembly of Turkish American Associations.

President Sezer as 'deus ex machina'
By Semih Idiz, Turkish News, Ankara, Turkey - It is a concept that is not widely used in everyday life, therefore I best start with a definition. Webster's Dictionary defines 'deus ex machina' in the following way: 'In ancient Greek and Roman plays, a deity brought in by stage machinery to intervene in the action.' There is of course an artificiality about this intervention. But it nevertheless changes the whole course of events often where events up to that point appear to be leading to a dead end.

So now we have President Sezer stepping in, as 'deus ex machina' to intervene and try and change the highly negative course of developments as far as Turkey's European Union membership bid is concerned. One has to admit , of course, that this characterization does not fit the president's initiative fully.

The reason is that the president is not intervening 'artificially' but with the full authority of his position.

It has become almost liturgical - in a secular sense - for all political parties in Turkey to maintain that EU membership is a 'policy of state' at this stage. A very serious gap has, however, developed between the 'liturgy,' and the situation on the ground. The notion of Turkey's EU membership has been politicized in a debilitating manner, and has brought the country to the point of serious divisions. The issues involved here are of course well known to all concerned with this matter.

Given the dead end that that the whole argument has been rapidly moving towards, it must be considered totally natural for the president to intervene at this critical juncture. After all, if this matter is 'a policy of state,' as everyone keeps repeating, then the logical conclusion is that if things are going awry the 'head of state' should try and set matters right.

What makes the president's initiative a 'deus ex machina' then, is not that it is artificial in any sense, but that it was totally unexpected. Just like in Greek plays where there seems no way out, and everything is heading for disaster until some divine intervention imposes its will, and changes the whole course of events.

Apart from the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and a clearly opportunistic True Path Party (DYP) to a certain extent, all the other parties in Parliament have reflected enthusiasm over Sezer's initiative. This includes the Islamist parties, which over the past five years have become surprising upholders of the Copenhagen Criteria for EU membership.

If we look at the MHP first, seeing as it provides the only genuine counterpoint to arguments about Turkey's need to become an EU member, the head of its Parliamentary Group, Mehmet Sandir, made it clear that the MHP is not exactly enamored of Sezer's initiative. Arguing that they supported the idea of 'consultative summit' such as this, Sandir nevertheless declared they would not attend it if it turned into one where the aim was 'to try and convince the MHP.'

What the MHP has to be convinced about here, of course, is the need for totally abolishing the death sentence, allowing mother tongue education ( which in this case means Kurdish), and lifting emergency rule (OHAL) in southeastern Anatolia. All three notions are anathema to this ultra-nationalist party. The MHP has made its position very clear on these issues, and this ultimately makes it irrelevant whether it attends Sezer's summit or not.

The reason it is irrelevant is that President Sezer, in turn, has made it clear he considers EU membership to be an indispensable part of Turkey's modernization drive, and is therefore going to try and seek 'supra-party solidarity' on this score. In other words he wants Turkey to become a member of the EU, and will try to convince the various party leaders that they should stop using this issue as fodder for their petty domestic squabbling.

The MHP, through its consistent opposition to key reforms needed for EU membership, has thus effectively excluded itself from the argument. It therefore has nothing to contribute during Sezer's summit in June, other than repeating its well known position.

Of course the MHP is playing a high brinkmanship game that could rebound on it politically. Most opinion polls have up to 70 percent of Turks supporting EU membership albeit for different reasons. Such poll are known to be notoriously unreliable in Turkey, so this assumption could be wrong. What is certain, however, is that, given the importance of the issue, Turkey's EU membership bid is going to be a central theme in the next general elections, whether these are early elections or not.

If up to 70 percent of Turks support EU membership, as is maintained, then the MHP runs the risk of being marginalized as the party that blocked Turkey's path to further modernization.

If, on the other hand, this assumption is woefully wrong, then we are faced with a totally new situation, with the MHP making a quantum leap forward politically. This will, of course, mean that Turkey has to chart a totally new course for itself. As to the matter of who it is that has to be 'convinced' by the president at his summit, it is of course the other parties, and specifically the Motherland Party (ANAP) and the DYP who have to be made to see that a topic like EU membership should not be used for scoring cheap points on ugly political arenas.

There are few who believe at this stage that Turkey will be able to fulfill the necessary requirement by its self-imposed deadline of December, in order to have the start of membership negotiations codified at the EU's Copenhagen Summit to be held then. But this does not mean that all will be lost, even if Ankara will face added difficulties. If the right political will can be mustered, and the reform process given momentum, then Turkey will still be in the running.

This is the historic mission that President Sezer is now undertaking. In other words he will try to revive and crystallize the political will that has been lacking in this government, and set Turkey on the right course as far as its EU bid is concerned.

Arguments and counter-arguments
By Gunduz Aktan, Turkish Daily News, May 18, 2002 - We found the opportunity to express our thesis on the Armenian question on the second day of the meeting organized by "Danish Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies" against the thesis repeated by the Armenian historians on the first day.

Armenian historians said that the "deportation" was a pre-planned genocide aiming to annihilate the Armenians rather than transferring them to a region far from the war zone. Starting from the claim that they had a 2-2.5 million population in Anatolia, they alleged that 1.5 million Armenians had been murdered during the "deportation". They insisted that the Armenian insurrections were just a response to the Ottoman oppression. They did not mention that they had fought first for autonomy then for independence; that with this aim resorted to 'Balkan model of struggle', namely 'killing innocent Muslim civilians to provoke Muslim attacks at the Christians and then calling for the help of European powers'; that they collaborated with the Russian armies and that Van rebellion they had launched on April 13, 1915 caused the relocation. According to them, the Committee of Union and Progress carried out genocide against the Armenians in order to create a homogeneous people with their crude nationalism. However, ethnic Armenian nationalism, which was even harsher than Turkish nationalism, had came into being at least 30 years earlier. As the Ottomans would not be able to anticipate the loss of Northern Syria, where the Armenians were relocated, they could not aim to create a homogeneous nation through genocide.

On the other hand the Armenian population was around 1.3 million before World War I. According to the League of Nations 400-450 thousand Armenians went after the retreating Russian armies to Armenia. There were also some Armenians who had not been subjected to relocation or others who returned from the regions where they had been relocated. Some also went to Lebanon, France and America.

Prof. Dadrian said that there could have been no civil war since the central authority had not collapsed. The central authority had not been collapsed during the American civil war, either. Moreover, the Ottoman Empire, which had been living its last days, collapsed at the end of this war. Thus it failed to organize the relocation well. It could not protect the Armenians for the gendarmerie forces had also been deployed to the front. It could not prevent internal clashes in various regions.

Prof. Dadrian said that the Armenians could not even protect themselves, let alone rebelling, since all the Armenian males in the age group of 20-45, had been conscripted. 250,000 Armenians should have been in the army for 1.3 million Armenians, 400,000 for 2 million. We know that most of them refused to take up arms and many fled the fronts. On the other hand, those who in fact were vulnerable were the Turks since the majority of them was drafted and fought on the three fronts at the borders of the country. The allegation that the "bloody murderers" in prisons were released and used in the Armenian genocide, Prof. Dadrian does not compare the number of murder convicts in the then small prison capacity and the area of 300,000 square kilometer where the relocation took place. Moreover, was there a need for such a bizarre method to annihilate a group?

Although the number of people died during the relocation is not exactly known, it must be very limited. At the same time as the relocation, the Ottoman-Russian war, the attacks by the Armenian gangs against civilian Turks, inter-ethnic killings and the attacks by the local gangs at the Armenians in the course of relocation were going on. Those who were uprooted and driven before the 'enemy' armies became victims of these massacres, epidemics, starvation or ordinary crimes etc. That's why the most appropriate word for these incidents is 'tragedy'.

In order to prove his thesis, Prof. Dadrian presented samples from the archives of our allies Germany and Austria and the verdicts of the end-war court martials as well as Parliament records as "compelling evidences". Why should not we look at the documents of other archives? On the other hand, the Liberty and Agreement government and its Parliament of post-1918 period was the deadly enemy of the Committee of Union and Progress. There was no 'fair trial' in the avenging courts established by it. As a matter of fact, the British Royal Prosecutor released the suspects in Malta because of a lack of evidence.

More importantly, 1,397 people, who had abused their offices or behaved badly against the Armenians during the relocation, had been sentenced by the military courts during the Committee of Union and Progress government between 1915 and 1918 and over 600 convicts executed. What kind of a genocide was this that the people were hung for killing the Armenians?

When it was said that "2.5 million Turks also died in the war" Prof. Dadrian retorted that we put together the different categories of death including the soldiers. However this figure originates from the Armenian National Delegation at the Peace Conference and from German military sources. Accordingly, more than half of the 2 million civilian dead were in the eastern Anatolia, while 500,000 were battlefield casualties.

The Armenians highly exaggerate their population and the number of Armenians died during the relocation, do not mention the Armenians who died due to other causes while totally ignoring the Turkish civilian deaths in order to prove the events to be genocide.

Greek Cypriot Administration, EU, and Consequences
"The Turkish Cypriots want a settlement which is just, sound and sustainable"

By Prof. Pierre Oberling

[THE WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF PROFESSOR PIERRE OBERLING ON BEHALF OF THE ASSEMBLY OF TURKISH AMERICAN ASSOCIATIONS TO THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS]

Mr. Chairman,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

On behalf of the Assembly of Turkish American Associations, it gives me great pleasure to address you, especially at a propitious time in the long history of the Cyprus conflict.

While the 38-year-old question has not, by any means, been resolved, a new process of direct negotiations is under way, which gives us reason for hope. And we all know how important this is in that troubled region of the world, where even American intervention cannot always bring ancient adversaries to the negotiating table.

The current process in Cyprus started with the initiative of President Rauf Denktas of the Turkish Cypriot side, who, at the end of the last year, called on his Greek Cypriot counterpart, Mr. Glafcos Clerides, to meet with him face to face, for the first time in nearly four years. His objective was, and continues to be,

a) to avoid a potential crisis resulting from the Greek Cypriot side's unilateral drive to become a member of the European Union, even before a final settlement of the Cyprus conflict is reached; and

b) to find a way to resolve the issue once and for all, so as to leave a united, peaceful and prosperous Cyprus to future generations.

Such a Cyprus would also serve as a bridge of cooperation between Turkey and Greece, two NATO allies, as well as serving the interests of the United States and the Eastern Mediterranean region.

As a word of caution Mr. Chairman, I wish to point out that the unilateral and unlawful entry of the Greek Cypriot administration into the European Union before a final settlement is reached would have dire consequences, for it would drive a wedge between Turkey and Europe and might well divide Cyprus permanently.

The talks, which started in earnest on January 16, 2002, are being conducted on the basis of no preconditions, all issues being on the table, and a commitment by the two parties to negotiate in good faith until a comprehensive settlement is reached. Nothing will be considered as having been accepted until complete package will have been accepted. It would, therefore, be counterproductive to put unnecessary constraints on the process by setting artificial deadlines or expressing concern for the lack of any breakthrough. As experience shows, this is a long and arduous process, which requires patience and perseverance, as well as a lot of good will and statesmanship on the part of the negotiating parties. Outsiders must exercise caution so as not to interfere in a delicate process and must help create an atmosphere conducive to progress, by treating the two parties to the dispute on a fair and equal basis.

Although the talks are being conducted in a spirit of confidentiality, so required by the U.N., it would be safe to say that the basic vision and principles on which the Turkish Cypriots are negotiating are those that have always guided them in their quest for freedom, dignity and peaceful co-existence with the Greek Cypriots, on the basis of sovereign equality.

What the Turkish Cypriots want is nothing more than their equal rights and status on an island, which, in the words of former President Clinton and the UN Secretary General, is "the common home" of the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots want to be good neighbors with the Greek Cypriots and enter into a new partnership with them, which will be just and viable. They rightfully do not want a repeat of the failed experience of 1960, a solution on paper which unfortunately was destroyed by the Greek Cypriot leadership within 3 years in 1963, bringing untold suffering and hardship not only to the Turkish Cypriots, but also on the whole of Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots want a settlement which is just, sound and sustainable.

Let us support them in this laudable endeavor.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Listening to Bernard Lewis
By M. Orhan Tarhan - I had the pleasure of listening to Prof. Bernard Lewis speak on May 25 at the Turkish Embassy in Washington, DC. It was a meeting of the Ataturk Society of America that H.E. Ambassador Faruk Logoglu had the kindness of hosting in the Embassy. The Ataturk Society was celebrating the May 19 day a few days later and bestowing "The Ataturk Award of Universality of Civilization and Peace" to Prof. Lewis. He spoke freely without notes. His speech was recorded and will eventually be published in the "Voice of Ataturk"

He took a sort of historical look from way above, spanning several centuries. He said when something unpleasant happens to a society or a state, the sort of question that society asks itself determines whether the society will get rid of that unpleasantness or not. If it asks "Who did it to us?", history will record it under "what went wrong?" The right question to ask would be "What did we do wrong?" or "What didn't we do that we should have done?" Only when these questions are answered correctly, there is the possibility of making course corrections. At the previous turn of the Century, Ataturk did ask the right questions and was able to find the right answers

Prof. Lewis made the evaluation of Ataturk's achievements as well as I would have expected him to do so. However, I thought he was amazingly lenient in evaluating the post-Ataturk era, especially the present. He said, that in the historic view, Turkey did not do so badly. He is right if one compares the Turkey of 1923 (The year the republic was proclaimed) with the Turkey of 2002. However, if one considers the rate of improvement between 1923 and 1938, we would get a pretty steep rising curve that suddenly flattens after Ataturk and continues as a mild hill from then on. Prof. Lewis looks at 1923 and 2002 and still sees improvement. I imagine how would Turkey look today if the Turks would have really understood Ataturk, if they would have listened to him, if they would have continued their drive toward civilization and would have contributed to it, as he wanted them to do.

Yes, it would have been an entirely different Turkey. If we look at the Turkish people, we see considerable improvement and advance in education, in industrialization, in the social behavior of the people, and in tourism. It has been the government that was weak, inefficient, expensive, and corrupt that causes most of the trouble. (This is not only my opinion, it is what the Turkish Press has been writing for years)

A historian such as Prof. Lewis may be satisfied with improvement over 80 or 150 years. However, the grandchildren of Ataturk should not be satisfied with it. Ataturk wanted them to catch up with the so-called civilized countries of the West. With the advent of the information age, they have to work much faster than the Americans, to catch up with them now.. What would take to put Turkey back on the path that Ataturk willed? Here are the absolutely necessary changes that should be made immediately:

Get rid of Partycracy, pass the election law allowing the people to elect all the candidates for parliamentarians in a primary election like in the United States. Thus a bond will be established between the voter and his so-called representatives.

Get rid of the proportional representation that socialist-minded professors of constitutional law put in the 1962 constitution and condemned Turkey to be forever governed by coalitions and weak governments. The solution to this are "narrow districts", as used in the United States.

Close all the Imam-Preacher schools that were the undoing of Ataturk's secular education laws. These schools are the same kind of Islamic schools built by the Saudis all over in Islamic countries, which teach hate of all Ataturk reforms and principles, the republican type of government, and anything connected with the West. It is the type of brain-washing that caused the Ottoman Empire to crumble.. It is the type of schools that produced the terrorists of September 11. These schools are downright dangerous. They must go.

It is not enough to be educated in secular schools like Western people and to be dressed like Western people to belong to the Western civilization Turks must also contribute to that civilization. Why is it that most of scientific literature and inventions published by Turkish names have been generated outside Turkey? Shouldn't the Turkish government be seriously concerned about this fact? The Turkish industries should start doing their own research to be able to compete with the products of the advanced countries. Turkey has internationally recognized musical performers, but few if any composers.

It is a wonderful thing for nations to make from time to time such evaluations as Professor Bernard Lewis did on May 25, 2002, for Turkey, especially if that evaluation triggers the proper course correction.