An Admission of Exclusion
By Guler Koknar, Executive director Assembly of Turkish American Associations,(Published in The Washington Times) - The European Union now stands at the Rubicon over Cyprus. It will soon decide whether to admit the Greek Cypriot administration in the south, exercising no sovereignty over Turkish Cypriots in the north, under the false pretense of governing the entire island.

An affirmative decision before a mutually agreed solution to a de facto division between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot democratic states since 1963 would be traumatic for the United States, NATO and all the peoples of the region. Whereas, a fair and just solution is staring back at the abyss: namely, unity featuring politically equal Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot statehoods.

A fourth round of direct talks between Turkish Cypriot President Rauf Denktas and Greek Cypriot President Glafcos Clerides commenced last month. Key to success is recognition in a culminating settlement of statehood for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) neither more nor less than Greek Cypriot statehood. That touchstone is no novelty or aberration on the world stage. Indeed, it is modeled after a two-state agreement between Montenegro and Serbia brokered by the EU itself on March 14, 2002. Similar examples abound in history. The case for distinct Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot statehoods coupled with unity over agreed subjects (e.g., national security, foreign affairs, and currency) that could expand with mutual consent, is irresistible.

The TRNC satisfies time-honored international law standards for statehood. It governs over defined territory populated by the Turkish Cypriot people and is endowed with the capacity to engage in foreign relations. All the more, it does so in a pluralistic democracy mirroring international human rights standards.

A political settlement in Cyprus must enshrine TRNC statehood to comport with international law and to avoid fantasizing that Greek Cypriots have any rule or control over Turkish Cypriots.

Recognition of TRNC statehood is essential to Turkish Cypriot security. If the Greek Cypriot side provoked conflict with Turkish Cypriot side, as happened in 1963-64, 1967, and 1974 seeking illegal union with Greece, its statehood would define the aggression as between two sovereignties within the clear jurisdiction of the United Nations Security Council, not a matter of domestic strife. That would trigger important protections of the Geneva Conventions on the conduct of war and the prohibition on territorial acquisition by conquest. Sovereignty recognition of the Turkish Cypriot State would be one of the most effective means of providing the Turkish Cypriots with the sense of security that they need and are entitled to.

Failure to recognize TRNC statehood would also cast a shadow over the laws and actions of its government since the de facto founding in 1963, including title to real and personal property. That sovereignty was compelled when Turkish Cypriots were evicted by brute force from constitutional offices and the Turkish Cypriot people suffered attempted extermination, as then United States Undersecretary of State, George Ball, verified to President Lyndon B. Johnson. Legal stability and fairness are also indispensable to attracting investment and sparking economic growth for the depleted Turkish Cypriot economy.

TRNC statehood recognition is further necessary to reassure Turkish Cypriots that the hearts and minds of Greek Cypriots ungrudgingly accept them as an equal co-partner in a new Cypriot enterprise. Ever since 1963 when Greek Cypriots torched the 1960 equal partnership Constitution of the then Republic of Cyprus, their fierce denial of TRNC statehood has been a code for their aim to dominate Turkish Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots have been consistently denigrated as a "minority" population. This is in stark contrast to the concept of political equality enshrined in the 1960 agreements by which the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot peoples co-founded the Republic of Cyprus. The TRNC cannot risk a Cyprus settlement vulnerable to destruction either instantly or on the installment plan because it was disavowed in Greek Cypriot textbooks and cultural idioms and accepted in the Greek Cypriot political and social cultures. This anxiety is not contrived, but has been stoked by Greek Cypriot violence and treachery from 1963-1974 during which Turkish Cypriots were massacred and plundered under the illegal banner of union with Greece, dubbed "enosis".

Turkish Cypriot insistence on sovereignty should not be misconstrued as an attempt to "pocket and run away with it", as the Greek Cypriot side claims. Just as forcefully, the Turkish Cypriots are also insisting on the continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee which is the strongest safeguard against such eventuality. It is the earnest desire of the Turkish Cypriots for a just and sustainable settlement that prompts them to insist on sovereignty, as a means of achieving rather than preventing it.

The two states with unity solution virtually echoes the EU sponsored agreement between Serbia and Montenegro creating a new state of "Serbia and Montenegro."

Why should Cyprus be treated differently?

A Dragnet Prohibition?
By Bruce Fein - Do you think a law that makes criminal the broadcasting of speech that "spreads fear" or "raises a sense of pessimism" is both imprudent and offensive to freedom of expression?

The question is far from academic. Last month, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer applied to the Constitutional Court seeking annulment of the Law on the Supreme Board of Radio and Television (RTUK) which does exactly that.

The President worried that the twin prohibitions steeped in oceans of ambiguity would impair the right of citizens to receive information essential to a healthy democracy. As United States Founding Father James Madison lectured, knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a people who mean to govern themselves must arm themselves with the power knowledge gives.

Vague laws that restrict speech seem threefold objectionable. First, they invite selective and invidious enforcement against government opponents or critics. Take the RTUK. Suppose during a frightful earthquake, a broadcaster denounces the government for failure to enforce more rigorously building codes and forecasts hundreds of casualties and millions in financial losses from damaged houses and businesses. Turkish citizens become fearful of their lives and property. The broadcaster could be prosecuted, even if everything said proved true.

On the other hand, suppose a broadcasting friend of the government alerted Turkish citizens to a suspected PKK terrorist attack in Istanbul. Fear spreads, and precautions are taken. The government would likely ignore the RTUK violation for spreading fear because sympathetic to the counterterrorism speech broadcast.

Selective enforcement of laws confining speech, however, fosters imbalanced or twisted understandings by the citizenry. It lacerates their ability to make informed electoral judgments and evaluations of their government. It impugns the democratic idiom that governments are established to serve the people, not vice versa. Further, selective enforcement removes a pivotal legislative check on laws that overreach: namely, a mandate that a law that applies to one must apply evenhandedly to all. Friends or cronies can enjoy no exemptions.

The RTUK speech proscriptions also stain fundamental fairness. A law should warn before it strikes. Otherwise, it becomes dangerously close to an ex post facto criminalizing of expression that was lawful when disseminated.

But how is a broadcaster to know what speech might "raise a sense of pessimism." Consider the following possibilities. Broadcasting a weather forecast predicting rain during a planned outdoor national celebration in Istanbul.

Broadcasting a plunge in the value of the lira and a predicted rise in import prices.

Broadcasting a breakdown in the Cyprus talks between Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus President Rauf Denktas and Greek Cypriot leader Glafkos Clerides.

Reporting a bleak medical assessment of Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit's health.

Broadcasting a prediction that the European Union will reject Turkey's application for membership.

Reporting that the United States has balked at preferential tariffs for Turkey's textile exports.

All of these examples could engender pessimism in some, but evoke indifference in others. How would a broadcaster know which would predominate among listeners or viewers? Moreover, if pessimism predominated by only a 51% to 49% margin, would the RTUK be violated? Would every member of the broadcast audience be required to testify at trial with no concession for the shortness of life? And what about speech that spawns pessimism in some but elation in others, such as a pre-electoral poll report showing a vertical fall in the popularity of one party and a meteoric climb in popular support for a rival? Is the optimism to be subtracted from the pessimism to determine whether a RTUK speech crime has been perpetrated?

The colossal vagueness of the RTUK will also deter the broadcast of speech that falls outside its uncertain ambit. Broadcast properties are valuable. Owners and operators naturally wish to avoid the umbrage of government, which controls broadcast licensing. The cost of defending against an unjustified RTUK prosecution may be prohibitive. Thus, the law will hang like a Sword of Damocles over the heads of broadcasters, and frighten them from legitimate speech that government officials may dislike to avoid skating close to the criminal line.

Turkey, however, would profit by a freer marketplace of ideas exceptionally important as its democracy evolves and flowers. It would make political parties more grass-roots and less cult-like; it would strengthen the influence of informed public opinion; it would promote the discovery of political truths; and, it would more readily expose government misjudgments, corruption, and maladministration.

Some speech restrictions are appropriate, such as prohibitions on obscenity, the false and defamatory, or publication of military secrets. But restrictions should be exceptions, not the rule, and should be undertaken with a scalpel, not a blunderbuss.

Constitutional scholar Bruce Fein is a nationally-syndicated journalist and an ATAA Adjunct Scholar.

Ecevit's Health
By M. Orhan Tarhan - Prime ministers are usually appointed to head a government and to solve problems. However, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit has become himself a problem. I am not talking about all the crises he has caused, all the corruption he failed to eliminate, and the poverty he inflicted on the Turkish people. No, these were old problems which we repeatedly discussed. I want to discuss his health. Although this is not really a new problem, it has gotten so bad that Turkish Journalists openly write about when they think he will resign, and who might replace him. I Just read my article titled "Turkey at The Start of 2001" where I wrote "The government of Turkey is presently run by an old sickly prime minister, who is only a few days a week on his job. The rest of the time, his wife runs his business." This has not changed since January, 2001, in fact it got much worse. In spite of this incapacity, he does not resign and there is nothing in the Turkish political system that can make him resign. Illness, physical incapacity, are not new things in democratic governments. Franklin D. Roosevelt could not use his legs. He went everywhere on wheel chair, but he was a very good president. I do not remember anybody asking him to resign because of his incapacity. In the early years after WWII, the United States had a Secretary of State who walked on crutches. In those years, to me it looked odd that the representative of the strongest state in the World should walk on crutches. Once I mentioned that to Ambassador Selim Sarper. He said that the secretary of state has some problem with his legs, but he does not make foreign policy with his legs, he uses his head and he has a good head over his shoulders. Also, he is a darn good secretary of State". I am sure, the same thing could have been said about FDR.. Can we say the same thing for Bulent Ecevit.? Unfortunately we can't. He also is supposed to govern the Turkish state with his head, not with his legs, but precisely that is the problem. He is rumored to be in the first stages of senility and that he is taking the usual pills to slow down that process. It was reported by Turkish columnists that he confuses all sorts of things: He calls Tony Blair the "Foreign Minister of England" and the new president of Afghanistan Karsai "The General Director of Afghanistan." Either these people will feel insulted, or some one will tell them that they should not get mad at Bulent Ecevit, because the poor fellow is getting senile. Anyone who is this confused, is apt to make terribly damaging mistakes. It is dangerous to have him at the helm. Some one he respects, should tell him these facts of life and should make him agree to resign.

The Turkish constitution provides for the President of the Republic to appoint a Prime Minister, but does not permit the President to fire him. That right is rightfully given to the Parliament. Any time the parliament can give him a vote of no confidence and he goes. But that is designed for normal democracy in which the parliamentarians are elected by the people. In Turkey democracy has been changed to Partycracy by the late Turgut Ozal. In Partycracy the parliamentarians are appointed by party bosses and people elect parties, not people. So, parliamentarians are (to use President Sezer's expression) the "soldiers" of the party bosses, they would not dare voting against the wishes of their boss. That is why prime ministers in Turkey are now semi-dictators. No one can budge them from their place, even when they become senile.

Post Scriptum -- Two weeks have passed. Everybody in the Turkish press is now talking about Mr.Ecevit's health. The poor fellow has not been in his office for an entire month. He was in no condition to do work. He was in and out of the hospital. The last time he was in the hospital he was a neurology patient. In Turkey, when someone is ill, one wishes him "Gecmis olsun" which corresponds to our expression "I wish you well". Literally, it means "May it be passed" , I wish Mr. Ecevit and the real injured, the Turkish State, GECMIS OLSUN.

The above views belong to its author and do not necessarily represent the official views of ATAA or The Turkish Times.

The Turkmen View of Democracy in Iraq
After decades of civil wars, political terror and hatred, transforming this society is no easy task
By Orhan Ketene, Turkistan Newsletter June 10, 2002 - The Turkmen of Iraq, as the third-largest segment of the Iraqi people, have always looked forward to a free, democratic Iraq where they would feel safe and free to develop their own political, social and economic institutions and contribute to the prosperity of the country they live in.

The establishment of the 'Northern Safe Zone' was a great opportunity for building a model for the Iraq of the future. It was a good chance to prove that in a free atmosphere, Iraqis are able to establish a civil society that would be a good example for the rest of the Iraqi people suffering under the dictatorship.

Although the Northern Safe Zone (or no-fly zone) included only 10 percent of the Turkmen population (Erbil and Kifri), they were still able to establish their own political parties, social institutions and economic structure. On April 24, 1995, the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) was established as an umbrella organization bringing together six political and social organizations which reflected the aspirations of all the Turkmen.

Democracy is a delicate system that works with the cooperation of all sides. It requires patience, proper education, very wide perspectives and tolerance. Iraq and the Iraqi people had never seen or practiced a full democracy. Therefore, after decades of civil wars, political terror and hatred, transforming this society into a democratic one is no easy task.

Today, 11 years after the establishment of the Northern Safe Zone, there is no model for a future Iraq. Instead, there are two party-administrations, one in Sulaimanieh and the other one in Erbil. The ITF exists in both areas. Maintaining its neutrality, it tries to have good relations with both of them. It respects their achievements and efforts to improve the daily lives of the people of their respective regions. After the brief occupation of Erbil by the Iraqi Army on August 31, 1996, relations of the ITF with the KDP administration in Erbil have not been on the desired level. Despite good will on the part of both sides, some rogue elements managed to cause disturbances such as the attacks on ITF members and buildings in August 1998 and July 2000.

The source of the problem springs from different perspectives and interpretations of the original idea of creating the Northern Safe Zone. Instead of establishing a government and a parliament that would represent all segments and political inclinations of the Iraqi people, we see a one- party rule that represents only one political view. In order to achieve harmony, cooperation and mutual benefit, the KDP administration in Erbil has to accept the Turkmen reality. It should regard the Turkmen as partners, not subjects.

The KDP and ITF should overcome their differences with mutual respect and cooperation to be a good example for the rest of the opposition parties, and their aim should be achieving prosperity for the Iraqi people.

The Turkmen are a separate entity just like the Kurds and Arabs. Their population is sizeable, their oil-rich lands are a national asset carrying strategic importance, and they have played a great role in Iraqi history for the past 11 centuries. Therefore, minimizing their role in Iraqi politics and considering them an 'unimportant minority' and dismissing them from the Iraqi solutions will not solve the Iraqi question. Iraq needs the Turkmen and the Turkmen need Iraq.

Northern Iraq is the only part of the country that is not ruled by the dictatorship of Baghdad. The Iraqi opposition parties have no choice but to try to make the democratic experience work. If a democratic Iraq model does not work in the north, it is doubtful that it will ever work in the rest of the country. The Iraqi people and the free world expect to see a unified, strong Iraqi opposition. The time has come for Iraq to take its place among the civilized nations of the world.

Orhan Ketene is the US representative of the Iraqi Turkmen Front.

Limits of Turkey's "Strategic" Partnership with the USA
Issues of Iraq, Democratization, and the EU
By Dr. Ihsan D. Dagi, Visiting Fulbright Fellow, Department of Government, Georgetown University, dagi@metu.edu.tr (PART I of II)- May 14, 2002, Washington, DC - Turkish government, which has long time considered its "geopolitics" as an asset in its relations with the West, was comforted by the attachment of a strong strategic emphasis to US foreign policy towards Turkey in the aftermath of September 11 attacks. This emphasis was particularly important in the light of the recent economic crises, which left the country desperately in need of aid from international financial institutions. Turkey was also relieved since the notion of "strategic partnership" clearly embodied a sense of tolerance and understanding for Turkey's 15-year war against the terrorist group PKK and its clampdown on Islamic groups, as the US witnessed its worst terrorist attack in its history. Turkish Premier Bulent Ecevit's visit to Washington DC in January 2002 was therefore hailed as the confirmation of Turkey's "new strategic partnership" with the US.

Contrary to the prominent opinions, which has supported and called for an enhanced US-Turkey strategic ties in the post-September 11 era, this paper intends to challenge the validity of the concept and argues that the strategic partnership between the US and Turkey carries significant restrictions and deficiencies. First, there are limits to improve economic ties between the USA and Turkey to form a full-fledge partnership, and second, even the political leg of this partnership which is almost taken for granted in the light of mutually spelled out interests, is not as rock-solid. Still, this concept is not only increasingly put forth by the US opinion makers to secure Turkey's support for the US-led war against terrorism, but it is also consistently pronounced by some influential circles in Turkey as an alternative to Turkey's quest to join the EU, which is part and parcel of domestic power struggle speeded up since Turkey was declared a candidate country for the EU membership in 1999.

The Question of Iraq
US' policy towards Iraq exposes the limits of Turkey's "rediscovered" strategic alliance with the US in post-September 11 period. Since the Gulf war of 1991, Turkey has found the US policy towards Northern Iraq worrisome and always maintained its doubts about the objectives of the American policy towards the Iraqi Kurds. Yet, it chose to act together with the US in an attempt to influence the developments in the region.

Now, as a military operation against Iraq is back on the agenda, the Turkish government faces hard choices, and however reluctant it may be, it has to make a decision. It seems that the position of Turkey in a war against Iraq is important both for the success and legitimacy of such an operation, given the increasing reluctance of the Arab allies of the US. So far, confusing signals have been sent by the Turkish side. While Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and the Chief of General Staff Huseyin Kivrikoglu publicly warned the US against the risks involved for Turkey in an Iraqi operation, Premier Ecevit gave the impression that a bargain could be stroke.

The question remains if Turkish support is forthcoming for an eventual American operation to topple Saddam. Both the government in Turkey and public at large have doubts about the wisdom of waging another war on Iraq. Turkey does not raise objections against removing Saddam from power, yet uncertainties in a post-Saddam Iraq raise serious concerns. Despite all this, undergoing a serious economic crisis and relying on the American support for the continuation of the loans from the international financial institutions, the Turkish side is bound to be supportive of a war against Saddam.

However, the political and economic costs of such a war would be a huge burden on Turkey's shoulders involving both short-term and long-term repercussions. On the economic front, a war against Iraq would cause Turks to continue to lose millions of dollars for an unforeseeable future, who have already lost a considerable amount as a result of the sanctions imposed on trade with Iraq since the Gulf War. Moreover, a renewed fighting and instability in the Iraqi side would adversely affect Turkey's southeastern economy that has been improving in the recent years through border trade with Iraq. The disruption of regional economy would be a blow for the Turkish government who tries to win the support of Kurdish population living in the region, after the defeat of PKK's military uprising. In addition, a war in the region would hit already shaky Turkish economy suffering its worst economic crisis in recent decades. It would certainly slow down the flow of foreign capital when it is most needed to boost confidence in economy and, no doubt, will hit tourism revenues, the last stronghold of Turkish economy, amounting to 10 billion dollars income annually.

Aside from the economic problems, the chief Turkish concern is disintegration of Iraq in the wake of a war that may pave the way for the establishment of a Kurdish state with 'undesired' repercussions on the Turkish side. As the Americans spell out deploying the Afghan model by which Taliban regime was destroyed by a coalition of the armed opposition groups in Afghanistan, the Turkish concerns about the role to be played by the Kurdish groups in the war against Saddam and in the post-Saddam Iraq gradually increase. If Kurdish groups in the North were used to topple the Saddam regime with a strong boost by the American troops, the Kurds would be the main beneficiaries of the operation.

As the Iraqi case displays, the idea of a new "strategic" cooperation between Turkey and the US, brought up in the aftermath of September 11, is likely to contain serious problems and risks for Turkey. The case also demonstrates that the strategic interests of two countries in the Middle East and Central Asia do not always correspond.

It is uncertain how long Turkey can go along with US strategic priorities in its regional relations, as its bid to join the EU, which is not very favorable to US' Middle East policy, moved ahead. A good example of this setback is the reaction in Turkey against the recent intensification of Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories and the consequent destruction of Palestinian homes and civilian deaths particularly in Jenin led a public fury against Israel in Turkey. Moreover, strong criticism by Premier Ecevit, along with other top officials in Turkey, cast doubts about the sustainability of Turkey's strategic relations with Israel. Ironic coincidence of Turkish government's decision, on the other hand, to grant a 675 million USD tank modernization project to Israel at the beginning of Israeli occupation of Palestinian cities highlighted the delicate nature of Turkish-Israeli "security cooperation". However, without inclusion of Israel into the "new Turkish-American strategic partnership", the whole idea would lose a crucial ground.

Political Reforms and the Position of US
Put Iraqi question aside, post-September 11 framework brought some elements of comfort for the Turkish state. Primarily, it led to the belief that Turkey emerged once again as a "model country" for the Muslim world with its democratic and secular regime in the face of radical Islamic challenges. Equivocally, the conception of Turkey as a role model also provided the justification for those in Turkey who try to block political reforms required as part of Turkey's accession process to the EU, as the idea implied that there was hardly be any need for further political reforms. In this sense, this particular group came out as strong advocates of a new partnership framework between Turkey and the US.

However, the promotion of Turkey as a democratic and secular Muslim country is ill conceived simply because the issues related to democracy, secularism and Islam are the problems contemporary Turkey has yet to resolve. Thus, the model needs to be established at home before exporting to the Muslim world. Nonetheless, it is not surprising that the "new" Turkish model receives support from the conservative/republican groups in the American administration and public opinion leaders in the US as well as the Turks who consider Turkey as a regional power with just enough degree of democracy and human rights in the face of perceived risks emanating from Islamist and Kurdish nationalist challenges.

As the top priority of US administration has been the fight against terrorism within the past couple of months, which even led to building coalitions with authoritarian governments, the importance of human rights and democratization on the US foreign policy agenda has rapidly diminished. It would, therefore, not be realistic to expect a "sincere encouragement" of the US republican administration for Turkey's further democratization, which seems to consider democracy as a "risk" in Muslim countries in the face of "popularity" of Islamist leaders. Questioning the "wisdom" of pursuing a liberal democracy finds its echo among the Turkish state elite who constantly refer to "Turkey's particularities" to opt for a "limited democracy". Such coincidence of opinions concerning the wisdom of democracy "in times of threats", which is a constant state of affairs in Turkey due to its sizable "internal enemies", precipitates the "search for a new strategic partnership with the US" as promoted in recent months. (Will continue in July 1 issue of TT)