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What Happened on Nov 3? On Sunday, November 3, 2002, 32.7 million voters (79% of all those registered) evicted virtually the entire Turkish political establishment. The Justice and Development Party's (AKP) landslide win with 34% of the vote overshadowed the Republican Peoples Party (CHP) showing (19%). This means that none of the other parties that contested the election, including the Truth Path Party (DYP), the Motherland Party (ANAP), the National Action Party (MHP) or the Democratic Left Party (DSP) will be represented and their leaders are headed for political oblivion. Devlet Bahceli, head of the MHP party, has already resigned. Tansu Ciller is being pressured to resign by DYP the leadership and Mesut Yilmaz of ANAP is expected to resign as well. Prime Minister Ecevit (DSP) said simply, "We committed suicide." He was referring to his giving in to pressure to hold early elections, which were originally scheduled for May 2003. What happened? 1. It was not a rejection of Turkey's bid to join the EU because the AK Party and its leader, Tayyip Erdogan, have been consistent in their support of it. 2. It was not a clear victory for an Islamist party whose agenda is to impose fundamentalist religion on a secular Turkey. Erdogan has insisted that his party is a center-right, moderate party and that it doesn't seek to change "lifestyles." 3. People voted for AK partly because it was perceived as the inheritor of the previously banned religious parties, Refah, Virtue and Salvation. However, it also attracted votes from MHP supporters, who became disillusioned with their party's performance in the coalition-believing that it had sold out its principles. Others voted for AKP because it was "none of the above," meaning that it offered a clean break with the corruption, ineptitude and mismanagement of the traditional, establishment parties. Some 15-20% of AKP's votes came from the abandoned center (DYP and ANAP). 4. AK also won, in part, because of the collapse of the Left. CHP came back from the oblivion during which it had no representation in parliament due to widespread disillusion with the other parties to the left of AKP. It attracted votes from those who wanted "anything except AKP." Kemal Dervis was credited initially with bringing new notes to CHP, but, in retrospect, it appears that he cost the party as many votes as he gained. Many voters were disappointed by his failure to bring Ismail Cem (YTP) and other defectors from the former coalition over to CHP. Had he and Deniz Baykal succeeded; CHP may have gained another 5 percentage. Also, Deniz Baykal lacks either charisma or new ideas. He was a familiar, if boring and comfortable old face. Dervis added some pizzazz, but not as much as some had hoped. 5. The campaign was very much about the personality of Tayyip Erdogan, who appears to have benefited from the legal ban on his taking part in a new government. He had the appeal of an underdog and he used it well. Why was the sweep so complete? 1. Who will determine the next Prime Minister? Erdogan insists that, as leader of the party, he has the right to do so. President Sezer has said that it is his responsibility by law to appoint the PM. 2. How will the advent of AKP affect Turkey's foreign policy, e.g., preparation for the Iraq war, relations with Israel, resolution of the Cyprus issue? 3. Will AKP use its parliamentary advantage to push through a constitutional amendment designed to permit Erdogan to become PM himself? 4. If Erdogan pulls the strings of the new PM from behind the curtain, who will truly represent the country? This creates an unprecedented situation. The outlook? If AKP follows through on their promise to become a responsible party of the center AND it can satisfy its diverse constituents, it has a chance to usher in a promising new era of two-party politics for Turkey. If not, unfortunately, Turks have the bad habit of assuming that the military will step in and save the day. This is one of many attitudes that must change. |